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TWO ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION CAPITAL ON FIRM BEHAVIOR 
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A growing stream of finance literature involves measuring the effects of organization capital 
(“OC”) on investment decisions, financial policy, and firm value. Li, Qui & Shen (2018) use the 
exogenous event of a merger or acquisition to determine whether high OC acquirers perform 
better. We extend the OC literature by considering economic policy uncertainty (“PU”)(Baker, 
Bloom & Davis, 2016), which is also exogenous to the firm, to determine the effect of OC on 
firms in the face of PU. Univariate tests show that high OC firms take more investment risk, 
have lower leverage, higher cash, lower total shareholder payouts, and higher future growth 
prospects. Multivariate panel regressions show that when controlling for PU, OC is significantly 
associated with investment activity. Higher OC firms also exhibit higher leverage, higher cash 
holdings and lower shareholder payouts (dividends + buybacks). OC is positively associated with 
firm value (Fama & French, 1998), and the coefficient of OC in the firm value regression is 15 
times higher for periods of high PU versus low PU. 
 
We assemble several streams of Finance literature in order to resolve conflicting theoretical 
predictions (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990) and empirical results regarding long standing 
differences in the agency view of financial slack, and the product market view. Univariate tests 
show high OC firms operate in industries more likely to have product market strains, have higher 
exogenous cash (“EC”), take more risk, have lower leverage, lower total shareholder payouts and 
higher future growth prospects. Multivariate regressions show that OC is positively associated 
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with EC. However, when controlling for a product market strain and the interaction of the 
influences, OC association with EC becomes negative, and the overall positive association is due 
to the interaction of the product market strain and OC. This implies high OC firms maintain 
modestly higher EC overall to aid product market performance. Firm value regressions point in 
the same direction as the interaction term of OC and product market strain has a significant and 
positive association with firm value. 
 
The essays add to the literature in three ways: 1) Expands the growing Finance stream studying 
organization capital, more properly using the Firm Efficiency measure of Demerjian et al (2010) 
for robustness tests. 2) Empirically demonstrates prior streams may not conflict, rather that OC 
has been a missing construct to understanding firm investment behavior and financial policy 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Acronym Term    Definition 
OC  Organization Capital   Intangible fixed asset representing firmwide  
Investment in information technology spending,  
training, apprenticeship programs, senior 
management compensation not billed to line 
managers, consulting fees, human resources 
recruiting and retention, spending on environment, 
social and governance, and firm community service.   
 
PU  Policy Uncertainty  Construct including news-based elements, 
temporary federal tax code provisions, and the 
degree of agreement of economic forecasts. 
 
PM  Product Market  Relative firm industry specific market share. 
 
SG&A Selling, General and  Income statement expense item for firm spending  
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Kraft Heinz was formed by the investment activity of 3G Capital and Berkshire Hathaway. 
Following four years of ownership, $1.7bln of cost cutting and a large $15.4 billion write-down, 
Warren Buffet admitted several mistakes with the investment 1,2,3,4. Finance literature theory and 
empirical results assert that organization capital (“OC”) is important to firm decisions, 
performance and value. Economic theory indicates that fixed costs are a prerequisite for firms to 
show increasing returns to scale. We extend the literature on organization capital by considering 
its effects on firm decisions and firm value in the face of two distinct exogenous challenges; 
policy uncertainty and product market stress. 
 
In chapter 1, we evaluate a growing stream of finance literature measuring the effects of 
organization capital (“OC”) on investment decisions, financial policy, and firm value. Li, Qui & 
Shen (2018) use the exogenous event of a merger or acquisition to determine whether high OC 
acquirers perform better. We extend the OC literature by considering economic policy 
uncertainty (“PU”)(Baker, Bloom & Davis, 2016), which is also exogenous to the firm, to 
determine the effect of OC on firms in the face of PU. Univariate tests show that high OC firms 
take more investment risk, have lower leverage, higher cash, lower total shareholder payouts, 
and higher future growth prospects. Multivariate panel regressions show that when controlling 
for PU, OC is significantly associated with investment activity. Higher OC firms also exhibit 
higher leverage, higher cash holdings and lower shareholder payouts (dividends + buybacks). OC 






4. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-berkshire-buffett-kraft-heinz/warren-buffett-says-berkshire-overpaid-for-kraft-heinz-idUSKCN1QE1F0  
firm value regression is 15 times higher for periods of high PU versus low PU. 
 
In chapter 2, we assemble several streams of Finance literature in order to resolve conflicting 
theoretical predictions (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990) and empirical results regarding long 
standing differences in the agency view of financial slack, and the product market view. Four 
prior theoretical and empirical streams of research motivate our study: 1) Agency theory holds 
that the separation of ownership and control incents firms to maintain excess cash, reducing firm 
returns (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 2) Differentially, a product market view notes the benefits of 
excess slack. Excess cash may enable firms to maintain investment plans and optimal financial 
policies during periods of elevated competitive stress (Fresard, 2010) and to deter or prevent new 
competitive entry altogether (Benoit 1984)(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). 3) Economic theory 
fairly well establishes that fixed costs internal to a firm result in positive economies of scale 
(Krugman, 1979). 4) Recent finance studies employing several measures of organization capital 
(“OC”) show an association with higher risk taking and firm value (Li, Qui & Shen, 2018). Our 
empirical objective becomes answering the research question ‘Do high OC firms facing product 
market strains hold more cash and does it enhance firm value?’   
 
Univariate tests show high OC firms operate in industries more likely to have product market 
strains, have higher exogenous cash (“EC”), take more risk, have lower leverage, lower total 
shareholder payouts and higher future growth prospects. Multivariate regressions show that OC 
is positively associated with EC. However, when controlling for a product market strain and the 
interaction of the influences, OC association with EC becomes negative, and the overall positive 
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association is due to the interaction of the product market strain and OC. This implies high OC 
firms maintain modestly higher EC overall to aid product market performance. Firm value 
regressions point in the same direction as the interaction term of OC and product market strain 
has a significant and positive association with firm value. 
 
The dissertation add to the literature in three ways: 1) Expands the growing Finance stream 
studying organization capital, more properly using the Firm Efficiency measure of Demerjian et 
al (2010) for robustness tests. 2) Empirically demonstrates prior streams may not conflict, rather 
that OC has been a missing construct to understanding firm investment behavior and financial 






















A growing stream of finance literature measures the effects of organization capital (“OC”) on 
investment decisions, financial policy, and firm value. We extend the literature by considering an 
exogenous factor, economic policy uncertainty (“PU”)(Baker, Bloom & Davis, 2016), to 
determine the effects of organization capital on firms in the face of policy uncertainty. 
Multivariate regressions show that when controlling for PU, organization capital is significantly 
associated with investment activity. Higher OC firms also exhibit higher leverage and lower total 
shareholder payouts. We find a robust, positive association with organization capital and firm 
value. The interaction of organization capital and policy uncertainty is also positively associated 
with firm value, particularly for fourth quartile (high) OC firms.  
 
1.1. Introduction 
In February 2013 private equity firm 3G capital, with the help of Berkshire Hathaway and 
Warren Buffet, took over H.J. Heinz in a transaction valued at $23bln. In March 2015 Buffett 
and 3G Capital acquired Kraft Foods and merged it with Heinz to form Kraft Heinz (Ticker 
“KHC”). As may be the case with takeovers by financial acquirers, 3G imposed steep cost cuts 
on the newly acquired firm. 3G had operational control over the investments and the combined 
entity targeted $1.5bln in cost cuts, on combined estimated sales of $29.1bln1, ultimately raising 
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the cut number to $1.7bln. In 2019, 3G Capital disclosed a ‘mega-impairment’, writing down 
$15.4 bln of KHC book value. The shares of Kraft Heinz have declined from a February 2017 
peak of $98 per share in December 2017, to $34 per share on the day Buffett said he overpaid 
and was wrong about the Kraft Heinz investment. The issue of fairly pricing Kraft is left to 
M&A literature. This paper is focused on a different question. Did KHC’s acquirers fail to 
understand the importance of Organization Capital and the damage to competitiveness and firm 
value aggressive S,G&A cost cutting would do? 
 
Firms make investments in tangible and intangible assets for the purpose of increasing firm 
value. Both types of assets are prerequisites for the firm to fulfill its purpose of efficient 
accumulation, processing and use of information (Prescott & Visscher, 1980). Each discipline in 
academic literature measures key intangible constructs. Management literature uses firm specific 
advantages (‘FSAs’) to explain the theory of internationalization of triad multinational 
enterprises (“MNEs”)(Dunning, 1977). More recently strategy academics have been motivated to 
examine what FSAs emerging economy MNEs possess to explain violations of previously 
hypothesized internationalization processes (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Marketing literature 
has additional challenges when evaluating intangibles. Marketing literature evaluates intangible 
assets expressed in brand value and instrumented with advertising investment and third-party 
ratings (Aeker & Biel, 2013)(Cobb-Walgren, Ruble & Donthu, 2013). Marketing literature also 
has to evaluate firm intangibles that lead to differentiation where an intangible service is the 




Finance and economics literature is intensively concerned with management, firm, industry and 
nation intangibles. Intangibles are, by nature, not directly measurable. Estimating the influence 
of intangibles on firm decisions and firm value is fraught with endogeneity issues. Information 
for processing is produced jointly with firm output. Specifically, for organization capital in 
particular production, selling, experience accumulation such as on-the-job training and, learning 
may all be joint products (Prescott & Visscher, 1980).  
 
Measuring payments to intangible assets has been demonstrated in the literature. A Cobb-
Douglas model in discrete time and a continuum of households has been shown to directly 
measure nation-level payments to a specified stock of organization capital (Atkeson & Kehoe, 
2005). At a firm-level unit of analysis R&D spending is a widely available income statement 
proxy for the firm intangible of innovation. R&D does not have a corresponding balance sheet 
account. Finance studies have adjusted valuation models account for R&D spending and 
innovativeness to show the effects of innovativeness and areas of market mispricing (Chan, 
Lakonishok & Sougiannis, 2001). At a firm-level unit of analysis not all intangible assets, or the 
corresponding income item, are proxied in such a straight forward manner as innovation. Indirect 
measurement of organization capital can be achieved with a total factor productivity model. Lev 
& Radhakrishnan (2005) indicate that OC may be obtained indirectly from the residuals of a total 
factor productivity model estimating sales as the product of physical capital (P,P&E), labor 
(number of employees) and innovation (R&D).  
 
An undesirable element of an indirect approach, noted by Lev & Radhakrishnan, to measuring 
OC is it may achieve precise quantification of what is not known about a firm. As such they use 
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the widely reported S,G&A income statement line item as a proxy for the firm specific advantage 
OC. The noise that may be present in S,G&A can be partly controlled by using industry median 
measures, and also tends to hinder finding significant associations rather than incorrectly 
rejecting a null hypothesis (Li, Qui & Shen, 2018). As such we adopt the capitalization of 
S,G&A spending as the explanatory variable of interest to address the effects of organization 
capital. We define organization capital as firm investment in formal and informal processes and 
systems to enhance productivity and value creation. As with prior studies OC is most directly 
linked to accounting data through S,G&A. OC is relevant to firm investment decisions and 
financial policy, and to firm value. Li, Qui & Shen (2018) establish a causal link between the OC 
of acquiring firms and post-deal performance. The study specifically notes that firms cutting cost 
of good sold rather than selling, general and administrative expenses, outperform. Financial 
policy, in terms of seasoned equity offerings, has been shown to link management quality to the 
level of firm investment (Chemmanur, Paeglis & Simonyan, 2009). 
 
In order to extend the literature on OC, given the endogenous elements of measuring this 
particular firm intangible, we relate it to an exogenous factor. Policy Uncertainty (“PU”) is 
exogenous to firms and it is important to real investment decisions of the firm (Bernanke, 
1983)(Nguyen & Phan, 2017), to firm financial policy (Huang, Wu, Yu & Zhang, 2015)(Yung & 
Root, 2019) and firm value. Systematic measurement of United States policy uncertainty 
according to the methodology Baker, Bloom & Davis (2012) enables us to link a firm’s 
investment in OC to an exogenous risk factor affecting all U.S. firms at the same time. The PU 
construct includes a news-based element, temporary federal tax code provisions, and the degree 
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of agreement of economic forecasts. The measure of U.S. policy uncertainty is available to cover 
the entire sample period of this study.  
 
The research question of this study is what is the effect of Organization Capital on firm risk 
taking, financial policy and firm value in the face of Policy Uncertainty? The results of the study 
will extend the literature in two ways. This will be the first study to relate OC to PU as an 
exogenous factor. The study shows how organization capital influences firm risk taking and 
financial policy due to external variation in policy uncertainty. Second, we link the study of OC 
to the stream of exogenous factors that influence all firms at the same time. Examples of this 
stream of research include studies of financial crises (Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016)(Yung, 
Li & Jian, 2015) and product market strain (Fresard, 2010)(Huang, Jain & Kini, 2018). 
 
Univariate tests show that high OC firms take more investment risk, have higher cash, lower 
total shareholder payouts, and higher future growth prospects. Multivariate regressions include 
continuous and quartile specifications of an explanatory interaction term of interest OC*PU. 
OC*PU is relevant for capex/TA, but not for all other measures of firm risk taking. Quartiles of 
PU and OC*PU are significant across most model specifications. We find that OC is relevant to 
firm value in full sample measures, as well as for subsamples of PU and OC quartiles. OC is 
positively associated with firm value, and the coefficient of OC with firm value is 15 times 
higher for periods of high PU versus low PU. The results are broadly consistent across multiple 
measures of OC, an instrumental variable instance of OC, and with Chemmanur et al (2009). The 
instrument for OC is state inevitable disclosure laws and unemployment insurance benefits 




The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant organization capital 
and policy uncertainty literature. Section 3 details the research design. Section 4 reviews results 
of the analysis. Section 5 summarizes key conclusions, lists limitations and identifies areas for 
future research.  
 
1.2. Literature review 
1.2.1 Organization Capital 
Literature is rife with alternative conceptions of organization capital. Holding unit of analysis 
constant, the models supporting OC studies can be classified as specific when including 
theoretically supported specific accounting line items, third party surveys, and demographic 
variables. OC measures may be classified as general when considering firm, industry or nation 
level inputs. Closely linked to organization capital for the purpose of defining firm quality, is the 
construct of firm efficiency. For the purpose of this review firm efficiency can also be 
conveniently classified by specific measures which overlap with management skill, and general 
measures oriented to measuring firm level efficiency. General measures are characterized by use 
of advanced econometric techniques such as data envelopment analysis (“DEA”), where 
efficiency or skill is defined by residuals from linear regressions. Specific measures of 
management skill are characterized by individual or group level data on management tenure or 
education, firm-specific external surveys (e.g. Computerworld 100) or by a specific theoretical 
link to standardized accounting line items (e.g. S,G&A). A working map of the classification 




Figure 1: Literature Review Two by Two Classification 
 
 
1.2.1.1. Specific Organization Capital 
Shareholders must share excess cash flow of the firm with skilled labor and managers. In order 
to estimate the split a model is required to measure the productivity shocks. The shock is 
associated with the choice that skilled managers of a firm have to depart their existing firm for a 
new firm (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). The consequence of the risk to cash flows from OC 
productivity shocks compared to physical plant capital shocks requires each form of capital earn 
corresponding risk premia. Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou (2013) use S,G&A to directly measure the 
association of OC and the risk premia. S,G&A is the most common direct measure of OC. It is 
assumed that S,G&A spending includes elements such as firm wide information technology 
(“IT”) spending, formal and informal training, apprenticeship programs, senior management 
compensation not billed to line managers, consulting fees, human resources recruiting and 
retention, ESG spending (environment, social and governance) and firm community service 
initiatives. Similar to R&D, S,G&A is an expense item rather than a balance sheet account. Also 
Organization Capital Management Skill
Specific
Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005                             
Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, 2012                        
Chemmanur, Paeglis, & Simonyan, 2009                        
Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013.                               
Li, Qui & Shen, 2018
Chevalier & Ellison, 1999                                
Betrand & Schoar 2003,                                     
Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007                                                                                                      
Bloom & Van Reenen 2010
General
Evenson & Westphal, 1995                           
Brensnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2002             
Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005              
Demerjian, Lev & McVay, 2012
Murthi, Choi & Desai, 1997                          
Demerjian, Lev & McVay, 2012   
Albequerque, De Franco & Verdi, 2013                
Delis & Tsionis, 2018
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analogous to R&D, capitalizing S,G&A provides a measure of a firm intangible asset that can be 
empirically tested to see if it is an intangible asset relevant to risk taking, financial policy and 
firm value (Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis, 2001).  
 
Further supporting capitalized S,G&A is the model of Lev & Radhakrishnan (2005) developed 
specifically to address the tacit and hard to measure nature of OC. The extent to which a firm is 
able to outperform, in terms of sales, the inputs of physical capital, number of employees and the 
investment in innovation, is attributable to the stock of intangibles of the organization. To move 
the literature beyond this general approach however, Lev & Radhakrishnan posit that capitalized 
S,G&A is an appropriate proxy for the residuals of the TFP model. Firms generally don’t 
specifically disclose key investments in OC such as employee training expenditures, average 
tenure, and brand enhancement activities. However, those items are often consolidated and 
proxied, in an industry specific way, into S,G&A. Such an approach to measuring intangible firm 
assets is common. R&D and patent filings are direct proxies for innovativeness (Balsmeier, 
Fleming & Manso, 2017)( Bhattacharya, Hsu, Tian & Yu, 2017) (Luong, Moshirian, Nguyen, 
Tian & Zhang, 2017)(Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh, 2012).  Indeed we believe it is straightforward to 
conceptualize that S,G&A captures much of the known firm investment in OC. Building on the 
capitalizing of S,G&A as a proxy for OC, Li, Qui & Shen (2018) relate it to the M&A 
investment success. Organization capital is shown to be causally and positively related to post 
deal performance. OC is also linked to post deal asset turnover, cost synergies and innovative 
efficiency.  
 
1.2.1.2 General Organization Capital 
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An alternative to specifically linking OC to S,G&A or exogenous third-party data 
(Computerworld IT 100 for example), OC can be measured with general, external to the firm, 
data. To motivate general OC theory, it is assumed that payments to organization capital 
accumulated by a firm are always positive, scale higher with entry costs and may be influenced 
by market structure. In developing a theoretical model of OC, Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) assume 
perfect competition, discrete time, and the return to owners is variable profit minus fixed costs. 
Changing the market assumption to imperfect competition increases the returns to OC owners. 
The expertise that one plant embodies in comparison to another is OC. Atkeson & Kehoe use 
national accounts profit data to estimate the share of payments to intangible capital are 10% 
greater than payments to tangible capital. 
 
Intangible capital has been considered in economic development literature. Evenson & Westphal 
(1995) have a common notion that tacit knowledge is a firm intangible, difficult to measure and 
difficult to transfer. The review undertaken is most concerned with the economic development 
implications of R&D in less developed countries. Nations have endogenous processes of 
technological change to potentially take advantage of growth and innovation opportunity. 
Investment in country-level and firm-level technology infrastructure is required to develop the 
industrial technology and organization capital required to compete. However, included in the 
required infrastructure investment are experience and knowledge of how to combine capital and 
labor for productive outcomes. Evenson & Westphal encourage future empirical research to fill 
in voids in understanding management processes that may improve productivity. This study falls 




1.2.1.3 Specific Management Skill 
One of the first papers to investigate the influence of management quality on firm investment 
and financial policies hypothesized lower firm leverage and better access to equity markets 
because quality managers keep owners informed, and suffer less cost of information asymmetry 
(“IA”) (Chemmanur, Paeglis & Simonyan, 2009). Lower IA also implies less need to signal 
future cash flow with dividends and thus lower dividend payout ratios, and higher investments. 
Prior to Chemmanur there has been some disagreement on determinants and relevance to returns, 
of firm financial policies. The gap remains in part due to challenges operationalizing 
management quality as a construct. The specific management skill indicator is seasoned equity 
offerings. Measures of information asymmetry include number of analysts following a firm, 
analyst forecast error, analyst estimate dispersion, average bid/ask spread, and liquidity. Manager 
fixed effects are associated with specific demographic characteristics such as education and age. 
The demographic characteristics were significantly associated with stylistic differences in 
decision making. The extensive differences in managers included both investment policy and 
financial policy.  
 
1.2.1.4 General Management Skill 
Generalizable theory of management skill based on widely available accounting data has been 
approached in the literature several ways. Such approaches are classified here as general when 
quantitative techniques are employed to calculated variables of interest in indirect ways. For 
example, data envelopment analysis (DEA) or linear modelling are often used in research 
designs to obtain residuals as a single measure to instrument for management fixed effects. We 
highlight two issues with this approach as a primary source of variation to explain variation in 
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the dependent variables. First, the theory and literature build up to the hypothesis of some 
general management skill models can be summarized as hypothesizing managers influence firm 
performance. We certainly do not take issue with the point. However, valid conclusions benefit 
from further theory development. Second, endogeneity issues are problematic in corporate 
finance research designs in general, and introducing general skill management skill scores may 
compound the issue. High skill managers may join firms for perceived quality (i.e. firm fixed 
effects) rather than firms benefiting exclusively from the skill of the managers. Regardless, 
several general management skill measurement techniques have become prevalent and are vital 
to comprehensive study of our research question.  
 
Demerjian, Lev & McVay (2012) use DEA to measure the industry adjusted efficiency of 
managers converting firm inputs into sales. The firm efficiency measure is closer in concept to 
OC than the MA measure. Murthi, Choi & Desai also use DEA to measure relative skill of 
mutual fund managers (1997).  Using three different constructs for CEO talent, Albuquerque, 
DeFranco &Verdi (2013) determine excess CEO pay is more attributable to unidentified skill 
rather than self-serving behavior. The second CEO talent construct uses the residuals of a pay 
benchmarking model to proxy for talent. Each prior study of specific and general management 
skill enables us to make theoretical inferences about potential associations between OC and firm 
behaviors in operating environments that differ due to exogenous factors.  
 
1.2.2 Policy Uncertainty alters investment and financial policy decisions of the firm. 
Policy Uncertainty is exogenous to firms. The aggregate level of uncertainty caused by actual 
and potential change in tax policy, regulation, and monetary policy is outside the direct control 
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of individual firms in the United States. Pindyck (1988) and Bernanke (1983) present models and 
predictions of the consequences of uncertainty on the investment decisions of the firm. 
Investment decisions of the firm include capital expenditures, mergers and acquisitions, and 
R&D. Examples of financial policy decisions include dividend and share repurchase, capital 
structure, accumulation of financial slack, and earnings management. Pindyck assumes the future 
has a non-zero level of uncertainty as a constant. The value of a firm relates to its assets in place 
and its future investment options. Uncertainty influences firm’s future investment decisions. 
However, it also may influence firm choice and action regarding investments in place. The latter 
choices tend to be more related to firm policy than strictly to investment decisions. The first type 
of decision corresponds to Bernanke’s conclusions about the consequence of uncertainty. Firms 
will retain the optionality of future investments rather than exercise the options in times of 
uncertainty. The negative association of uncertainty and investment is well established at the 
nation and firm level. Firms may also seek to retain optionality in financial policy decisions as 
well given the influence of uncertainty on assets in place.  
 
The influence of PU on investment and financial policy decisions has been studied. U.S. firms 
have been found to lower investment due to the uncertainty of state gubernatorial elections. Jens 
(2017) difference-in-difference research design showed a 5% to 15% drop in investment for 
firms headquartered in states with current elections. Firms did undertake to exercise some of the 
retained investment options in future periods as post-election firm investment rebounded. 
Elections have been found to reduce investment at a nation level as well (Julio & Yook, 2012). 
From the period of 1980 to 2005, across 48 countries, a national election was shown to reduce 
corporate capital investment by 4.8%. Firms may alter financial policies to retain future earnings 
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report optionality by altering discretionary accruals in periods of policy uncertainty (Yung & 
Root, 2019). PU has a pervasive influence on the real investment decisions of firms as well as 
the financial policy decisions of firms. However, a gap in the literature remains to empirically 
measure how, in the face of policy uncertainty, organization capital influences investment and 
financial policy decisions of the firm. OC is a firm intangible that improves the overall efficiency 
of a firm in converting physical plant, intellectual property and labor into sales and cash flow. 
We expect that OC will improve firm efficiency in periods of elevated PU. 
 
H1: Organization capital is positively associated with firm risk taking in periods of elevated PU. 
 
1.2.3 Policy Uncertainty, Organization Capital and firm value. 
Intangible assets are valued by the stock market. Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis (2001) 
measure the association of R&D intensity to firm value. The future returns of high R&D stocks 
is the same as low R&D stocks suggesting that the market efficiently incorporates R&D intensity 
into firm value. However, cross-sectional regressions indicate that high R&D/sales and high 
R&D/market cap firms earn future excess returns, despite having glamour stock valuations. The 
high future returns were essentially payments for high volatility. Said another way, the excess 
future return of the investment in innovation was compensation for the associated elevated risk. 
The choices made by a firm to productively convert resources to sales, attributable to OC, has a 
direct influence on value maximization (Prescott & Visscher, 1980). Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 
(2013) find high OC firms have higher average returns than low OC firms. This implies that the 
relative efficiency gain of the high OC firms more than offsets the elevated compensation and 
higher share of cash flow demanded by senior managers relative to shareholders. Using a 
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somewhat less common measure of firm value, abnormal earnings, Lev & Radhakrishnan (2005) 
estimate that OC accounts for 24% of the cross-sectional variation in the excess of the market 
value of firms to book value. The straightforward conclusion being that markets price OC as a 
factor expected to contribute to future growth.  
 
Policy uncertainty has a negative association with firm value. Episcopos (1994) model predicts a 
negative firm value effect of PU on assets in place, greater than the negative influence of 
delaying future investment options. PU theory is extended by Pastor & Veronesi (2012) showing 
the dual influence of uncertainty regarding a policy change and uncertainty regarding the effect 
of the change on firm cash flow. Rather than discovery by government announcement, investors 
discover policy change by observing firm cash flow. The predicted influence of PU on firm value 
is negative and is a function of both cash flow effects and discount rate effects. Quantitative 
predictions of the model are not influenced by the timing of policy announcement. The 
experience within an organization to deal with PU falls squarely in the construct of its OC. 
Intangible assets are relevant to firm value and policy uncertainty influences firm value, thus we 
expect OC will have a significant influence on firm value in the face of PU.  
 
H2: Organization capital is positively associated with firm value in periods of elevated PU. 
 
1.3. Research Design 
1.3.1 Organization Capital 
Following Li, Qui & Shen and Eisfeldt & Papanikolou we assume that S,G&A is indicative of 
spending and investment in OC. Li et al notes that noise in S,G&A from items not oriented to 
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OC biases against results with significant associations. We use four measures of OC. The first 
three use S,G&A directly. The fourth method serves as a robustness check to observe similarities 
and differences in measures of OC with a general measure of management skill. The fourth 
method is the firm efficiency score (“FE” or “FirmEffic”) available from Demerjian et al (2012). 
Using a perpetual inventory method we follow Li et al and calculate the initial stock of OC (1) 
and each subsequent year OC balance (2). 
 
OCi,0 = realSGA/ATi,1/(sectorG+DeprOC)    (1) 
 
OCi,t = (1-DeprOC)OCi,t-1 + realSG&Ai,t/ATi,t   (2) 
 
S,G&A is deflated by CPI as reported by fred.stlouisfed.org, and by total firm assets. Sector 
growth is the median compound S,G&A growth rate for a firm’s 2-digit GIC sector. The 
depreciation rate of OC is assumed to be 15% following prior literature and the bureau of 
economic statistics 15% depreciation rate for R&D capital.  
 
The second measure of OC is industry median adjusted OC. Within each industry there tends to 
be standard reporting conventions that make S,G&A comparable across firms. We subtract 
industry median OC from firm OC at the 2-digit level. The third method is 5-year straight line 
depreciation. This method follows Li et al (2018) and also follows Chan, Lakonishok & 
Sougiannis (2001) approach to calculating a R&D asset. The fourth measure is a robustness 
check on our S,G&A based measures. Demerjian (2012) provides data on his website for a DEA- 
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based general measure of FE, as it is closer to the characteristics of the efficiency inducing firm 
stock of OC, than the MA score also defined in the 2012 study.  
 
1.3.2 Policy Uncertainty 
The Baker, Bloom and Davis(“BBD”)(2016) policy uncertainty index is externally provided at 
www.policyuncertainty.com and serves as key independent variable on its own, as an interaction 
term with OC, and in splitting our sample into quartiles of PU. The BBD PU index provides a 
convenient way to measure of the economic influence of real or perceived government action for 
the purpose of estimating its influence on firm investments and policies through the channel of 
OC. The BBD policy uncertainty index is based on taking qualitative inputs to quantify policy-
induced economic uncertainty. The results often match ex ante intuition. For example, the BBD 
index shows large increases around wars and presidential elections.  
 
The standardized and normalized (mean=100) BBD index measures policy-related economic 
uncertainty. The index is reported monthly and is comprised of three underlying components. 
The first is text analysis of newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty. The 
second is a function of a count of expiring federal tax code provisions. The third element of the 
BBD index is professional economic forecast dispersion. We follow Nguyen et al. (2017) and 
annualize the index by summing monthly values as the authors demonstrate robust estimation 





From WRDS, for the period of 1998-2017 we obtain data on all U.S. firms excluding utilities, 
financials and ADRs. We eliminate firms under $5mln market value, under $5mln in revenue or 
a share price under $2. We also exclude firms with missing data reported for assets, revenue, or 
shares outstanding. Following prior literature we set to zero missing values for S,G&A, R&D 
and interest expense. Negative values for capital spending, acquisitions, R&D, cash, dividends, 
share repurchases, and interest are set to zero. We winsorize relevant continuous variables at the 
1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
We acquire and merge in data from several additional sources. We calculate an annual average 
CPI deflator from monthly consumer price index data obtained from fred.stlouisfed.org. Policy 
uncertainty data is obtained from the data source maintained by Baker, Bloom and Davis at 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com. Instrumental variables data is based on weekly 
unemployment insurance benefits and data on maximum number of weeks of benefits, as taken 
from https://fileunemployment.org/ unemployment-benefits/unemployment-benefits-
comparison-by-state.html. A dummy variable is used for whether states have adopted inevitable 
disclosure doctrine (“IDD”) laws is sourced . We merge in state level business combination 
(“BC”) law dummy variables for governance control. BC laws limit a firm’s ability to engage in 
large deals or merger transactions with new minority shareholders or their firms for a period of 
time (http://people.duke.edu/~charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglosb.htm). Firm efficiency is sourced 
from the personal website of Demerjian (http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html). A 
comprehensive list of variable definitions, sources and formulas is given in appendix Table A1. 
 
1.3.4 Summary statistics and correlations. 
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The total number of records in our database following this procedure is 66,243 (table 1), with 
4507 different firms with at least one-year of OC and valid data for each specified control 
variable. The average (median) firm has $2.65bln ($374mln) in assets, a market value of 
$3.326bln ($460mln) and revenue of $2.331bln ($347mln). The average firm has S,G&A 
expense representing 28% of assets and 30c of each revenue dollar goes to S,G&A. Mean 
(median) organization capital of 1.90 (1.44) compares to a mean of 0.97 (0.69) reported by Li et 
al. Li’s average firm is 55% larger than our sample, with average (median) assets of $3.187 bln 
(537mln). Eisfeldt & Papanicolaou (2013) report middle quintile OC of 1.09 with a quintile 
range of 0.27 to 2.71. Firms in our sample have a median ROA of 4.3%, one-year trailing sales 
growth of 7.9%, market to book of 2.11, cash/assets of 10.8% and total leverage of 48%. In 
terms of risk taking, our average firm acquisition, R&D and capex to asset ratios are 5.0%, 4.9% 
and 6.6%, respectively. 
 
Pearson correlations of key variables provide some notable associations including that OC is 
negatively and significantly correlated with dividend payout, leverage and firm size. OC is 
positively associated with market-to-book (“MTB”), Tobin’s Q, stock return and cash holdings. 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Assets Market Value Revenue S,G&A Cash/Assets Acquisitions R&D/Assets Capex/Assets Leverage
count 66,243         60,119         66,243         66,243         66,235         52,813         55,174         54,668         66,055         
mean 2,649.3        3,326.0        2,331.4        389.6           0.195           0.050           0.049           0.066           0.501           
sd 7,390.1        10,154.0       6,469.2        1,114.8        0.217           0.190           0.114           0.102           0.419           
min 7.6               9.1               6.8               0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p25 100.2           117.5           84.3             17.4             0.030           0.000 0.000 0.019           0.298           
p50 374.0           460.4           347.4           64.7             0.108           0.000 0.000 0.038           0.484           
p75 1,547.3        1,756.4        1,418.7        234.8           0.291           0.023           0.056           0.075           0.651           
max 51,759.8       76,218.5       46,499.0       8,319.0        1.000           10.121         7.478           4.876           74.934         
Dividend/Sales Div Dummy OC ROA Ebitda/Assets Sales Growth MTB Tobin's Q 1 Year Return
count 65,236         66,243         50,536         55,174         55,057         55,174         60,084         57,798         55,174         
mean 0.014           0.375           1.904           0.024           0.15             14.5             3.291           4.793           11.6             
sd 0.042           0.484           1.973           0.148           1.90             34.7             5.737           9.276           57.7             
min 0.000 0 (0.184)          (0.637)          (5.58)            (50.7)            (16.210)        (32.572)        (79.5)            
p25 0.000 0 0.574           (0.008)          0.07             (1.4)              1.244           2.162           (24.1)            
p50 0.000 0 1.440           0.043           0.13             7.9               2.116           3.375           2.8               
p75 0.009           1 2.602           0.090           0.20             21.4             3.771           5.489           33.1             
max 0.303           1 33.075         0.436           226.54         200.6           38.603         60.561         272.3           
Assets, market cap, revenue, s,g&a, mtb, sales growth, 1 year trailing return, roa, Tobin's Q, all winsorized at the 1st,99th percentiles.
S,G&A, R&D, acquisitions, capex, common dividends, interest expense and cash holdings all set to zero if negative.
Dropped financials, utilities, ADRs, foreign HQ firms, all firms with revenue under $5mln, less than $5mln in market cap or less than $2 stock.
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In terms of firm risk-taking correlations are less consistent, with notable positive associations 
with R&D spending but small negative results for acquisitions and capital spending. As 
expected, policy uncertainty is negatively and significantly correlated with investment activities 




1.4.1. Univariate analysis. 
Throughout the study the perpetual inventory method of calculating OC is denoted as such, 
industry adjusted perpetual inventory method is “OCb”, five-year straight-line depreciation is 
“OCc” and a DEA-based firm efficiency score is shown as “FE”. We begin our empirical 
analysis by splitting the sample into high and low quartiles for each of the four measures of 
organization capital. Each of the risk taking and financial policy variables in Table 3 are 
dependent variables in the multivariate regressions that follow. Based on a simple univariate 
analysis, the financial policy of high OC firms is significantly different from low OC firms. High 
OC firms have less total leverage, maintain more financial slack and pay out less total cash to 
shareholders. Firms with higher OC appear to invest more as shown by higher mean and median 
Table 1.2: Pairwise correlation of main variables.





















































































































































































































































































































































































 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001
Assets, market cap, revenue, s,g&a, mtb, sales growth, 1 year trailing return, roa, Tobin's Q, all winsorized at the 1st,99th percentiles.
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R&D and capital expenditures. The univariate finding on acquisition investment is less clear. 
High OC firms also appear to have substantially higher ROA and EBITDA variation than low 
OC firms. Overall, we consider our findings largely consistent with prior empirical findings. 
Panel D of table 3 splits the sample by FE rather than an S,G&A based measure of OC. Findings 
in panel D are directionally the same as Panels A, B and C for risk taking and operating 
fundamentals. Univariate data appears to confirm that high OC firms are more oriented to 
investment and risk-taking than a quiet life (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003) and distributing 
cash to shareholders. In terms of operating fundamentals high OC firms exhibit faster sales 





Table 1.3 Panel A: Univariate analysis with perpetual inventory method of Organization Capital
Q4_OC (high) Q1_OC (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value) (p-value)***
OC 4.436 (3.742) 0.219 (0.201)
Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.061 (0.041) 0.097 (0.054) 0.000 0.000
R&D/TA 0.087 (0.032) 0.037 (0.000) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.046 (0.000) 0.048 (0.000) 0.453 0.011
ROA sd* 0.215 (0.053) 0.058 (0.031) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA sd* 0.296 (0.138) 0.139 (0.117) 0.000 0.000
Financial Policy
Leverage 0.454 (0.408) 0.556 (0.567) 0.000 0.000
Cash Holdings 0.258 (0.200) 0.152 (0.056) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.007 (0.000) 0.03 (0.000) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales 0.029 (0.001) 0.058 (0.013) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 18.346 (9.04) 23.569 (8.505) 0.001 0.050
ROA 0.002 (0.045) 0.018 (0.034) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.193 (0.130) 0.129 (0.120) 0.096 0.000
MTB 4.562 (2.808) 2.929 (1.945) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.618 (3.765) 5.003 (3.576) 0.000 0.000
LnAT 5.066 (4.962) 7.031 (7.008) 0.000 0.000





Table 1.3 Panel B: Univariate analysis with quartiles of industry median adjusted organization capital.
Q4_OCb (high) Q1_OCb (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value) (p-value)***
OCb 2.687 (2.002) -1.194 (-1.166)
Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.065 (0.042) 0.059 (0.033) 0.000 0.000
R&D/TA 0.077 (0.016) 0.054 (0.000) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.047 (0.000) 0.047 (0.000) 0.961 0.000
ROA sd* 0.241 (0.049) 0.053 (0.031) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA sd* 0.323 (0.138) 0.125 (0.109) 0.000 0.000
Financial Policy
Leverage 0.468 (0.425) 0.524 (0.523) 0.000 0.000
Cash Holdings 0.236 (0.165) 0.213 (0.109) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.007 (0.000) 0.0160 (0.000) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales 0.028 (0.001) 0.053 (0.010) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 17.856 (8.83) 19.588 (7.886) 0.089 0.000
ROA 0.007 (0.049) 0.012 (0.036) 0.086 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.245 (0.137) 0.105 (0.115) 0.001 0.000
MTB 4.466 (2.682) 3.076 (2.064) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.652 (3.705) 4.832 (3.474) 0.000 0.000
LnAT 5.055 (4.956) 6.803 (6.683) 0.000 0.000
LnAge 7.340 (7.530) 7.664 (7.910) 0.000 0.000
Table 1.3 Panel C: Univariate analysis with 5 year straight line depreciation organization capital.
Q4_OCc (high) Q1_OCc (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value) (p-value)***
OCc 2.687 (2.002) 0.032 (0.031)
Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.065 (0.042) 0.087 (0.050) 0.000 0.000
R&D/TA 0.077 (0.016) 0.019 (0.000) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.047 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000) 0.659 0.000
ROA sd* 0.241 (0.049) 0.056 (0.031) 0.001 0.000
EBITDA/TA sd* 0.323 (0.138) 0.136 (0.117) 0.001 0.000
Financial Policy
Leverage 0.457 (0.425) 0.573 (0.576) 0.000 0.000
Cash Holdings 0.236 (0.165) 0.121 (0.055) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.007 (0.000) 0.028 (0.004) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales 0.028 (0.001) 0.056 (0.018) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 17.856 (8.830) 12.611 (6.206) 0.000 0.092
ROA 0.007 (0.049) 0.032 (0.037) 0.530 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.245 (0.137) 0.140 (0.120) 0.025 0.000
MTB 4.466 (2.682) 2.741 (1.871) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.652 (3.705) 4.902 (3.457) 0.075 0.001
LnAT 5.055 (4.956) 7.571 (7.576) 0.000 0.000




1.4.2. Multivariate regressions. 
Risk taking and financial policy variables are each used in turn with our series of five base-line 
multivariate regressions, and reproduced for each of the four formulations of OC. The base line 
regression is given in formula (3). 
 
Risk Taking it = β0i + β1iOC it +  β2iControlsit  + Industry FE +  Year FE + εit   (3)           
 
Formula (3) is the first of the five base line regressions presented in tables 4, 5 and 6. The 
remaining four specification of formula 1 substitute for OCit alone to include: ii) PU, iii) OC + 
PU + OC*PU, iv) OC + Q1_PU + Q4_PU + Q1_PU*OC + Q4_PU*OC, and v) Q1_OC + 
Q4_OC + PU + Q1_OC*PU + Q4_OC*PU. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. We 
Table 1.3 Panel D: Univariate analysis with Firm Efficiency ("FE") (Demerjian, 0212) used to measure organization capital construct.
Q4_FE (high) Q1_FE (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value) (p-value)***
FE 0.537 (0.474) 0.195 (0.208)
Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.07 (0.042) 0.066 (0.036) 0.010 0.000
R&D/TA 0.052 (0.003) 0.034 (0) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.049 (0) 0.031 (0) 0.000 0.000
ROA sd* 0.047 (0.028) 0.069 (0.041) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA sd* 0.134 (0.119) 0.134 (0.112) 0.971 0.000
Financial Policy
Leverage 0.537 (0.537) 0.513 (0.485) 0.006 0.000
Cash Holdings 0.181 (0.105) 0.155 (0.077) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.019 (0.003) 0.008 (0) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales 0.064 (0.028) 0.022 (0) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 18.292 (7.669) 7.967 (4.615) 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.072 (0.068) -0.029 (0.012) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.186 (0.167) 0.048 (0.082) 0.000 0.000
MTB 4.056 (2.847) 2.234 (1.475) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.751 (4.294) 3.664 (2.625) 0.000 0.000
LnAT 7.752 (7.829) 5.007 (4.85) 0.000 0.000
LnAge 8.194 (8.42) 8.105 (8.274) 0.000 0.000
*ROA standard deviation and EBITDA/TA variables calculated with 5 year rolling window.
**equal variance t-test that difference is means not equal to zero.
*** Pearson chi-squared test.
Assets, market cap, revenue, s,g&a, mtb, sales growth, 1 year trailing return, roa, Tobin's Q, all winsorized at the 1st,99th percentiles.
S,G&A, R&D, acquisitions, capex, common dividends, interest expense and cash holdings all set to zero if negative.
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do not include year fixed effects in estimations including PU as an independent variable. PU 
affects all firms at the same time each year.  
 
Risk-taking regression control variables follow the large body of prior literature to include firm 
size, leverage, performance, future growth prospects, cash holdings, trailing sales growth and 
stock returns, firm age and corporate governance. As a proxy for governance we use business 
combination laws (“BC”). The influence of business combination law on governance is the focus 
of Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003). The study includes a table of state-by-state business 
combination law precedents. BC laws continue to be used as a governance control in finance 
literature (Jiang & Lie, 2016). The attraction of using BC laws is a US list is easily obtained, the 
legal precedents are stable for long periods of time, it is an exogenous measure of governance 
and the underlying theory of a lower risk of hostile takeover is straightforward. The limitation of 
using a BC law-oriented governance control for empirical studies is the lack of international 
applicability as the legal jurisdiction applies to U.S. domiciled firms only. 
 
We find that without controlling for PU, OC is strongly associated with firm risk taking (p<0.01 
in 4 of 5 measures). In order to interpret the OC coefficient consider for example B1 = 0.003 for 
the partial effect on dependent variable capex/assets, and an OC sample standard deviation of 
1.973. A one standard deviation increase in OC is associated with a 0.6% higher level of 
capex/assets. Given a mean capex/assets ratio 6.6%, a one standard deviation increase in OC is 
therefore associated with a 9% increase in capex. The association of OC with acquisition activity 
is not significant, however the positive sign on the coefficient fits expectations ex ante, and with 
univariate analysis showing no difference in acquisition means but significant differences in 
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terms of median (p<0.01). Consistent with current theory PU has a negative and significant 
influence on capital spending. Controlling for PU, OC has a significant and positive influence on 
firm risk taking and the magnitude of the partial effect of OC changes very little when 
controlling for PU. Hypothesis 1, that OC has a positive and significant influence on firm risk 
taking when controlling for PU, is supported. The interaction term OC*PU is also positive and 
significant in base-line regression 3. Splitting the OC*PU interaction term into quartiles of PU, 
shows a strong positive and significant association with investment activity. High OC firms (4th 
quartile) exhibit significantly higher roa and ebitda variation when controlling for PU. We 
interpret this result to mean the high OC firms are more oriented to strategy than just year to year 
financials. Results are largely consistent across the four formulations of organization capital. 
Table 4, Panel D shows that FE score, based on a more general measure of OC, shows a stronger 
significant association with R&D spending than OC calculated from firm and industry S,G&A. 
 
Financial policy multivariate regressions show modest differences compared to univariate 
results. A test of difference of means indicated high OC firms had lower leverage and higher 
cash balances. Across the five base line specifications that match our risk-taking models, a 
multivariate leverage model controls for firm size, future growth prospects, returns, asset 
intensity, trailing stock returns and non-debt tax shield. Cash holdings model controls follow 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson (1999).  Table 5 Panel A shows a different association for 
capital structure. OC is positively associated with firm leverage and modestly higher financial 
slack. The change in sign of leverage is consistent with higher level of risk taking and returns for 
high OC firms. Splitting the sample into high and low OC, while controlling for PU and 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The dependent variable dividends plus buybacks relative to sales provide clear empirical 
direction about the influence of OC on cash flow allocation. Even as shareholders have claims on 
excess firm cash flow in the modern corporate form, Table 6 Panel A indicate that high OC 
managers have a significant claim as well (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). We estimate a 
negative and significant (p<0.01) association between OC and total shareholder payouts. For 
every standard deviation difference in OC, controlling for PU and the interaction of PU and OC, 
total shareholder payout is $1.60 less per $100 of revenue. Given mean sample revenue of 
$2.331bln, a one standard deviation higher OC firm pays out $37mln less per year to 
shareholders. The excess cash not going to dividends and buybacks is split between employees 
and capex in particular.  
 
1.4.3. Firm Value 
Testing hypothesis 2 requires estimating the effects of OC on firm value under PU. We follow 
Fama French (1998), with modifications to suit our study. The model is well cited and well used 
in Finance literature, in part because it is readily adaptable and robust to different research 
designs. By way of example, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), and Pinkowitz, Stulz & 
Williamson (2006) estimate the association of cash (another potentially endogenous explanatory 
variable) and firm value based on a modified Fama French model. The current level of OC 
should approximately cover what is empaneled in current firm value, with two year forward 
independent variables providing inference about expected persistence of OC. The base 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Market value/total assets is the measure of firm value used as the dependent variable in equation 
(4). OC is the explanatory variable of interest, as well as quartiles of OC and PU, and interaction 
terms. Control variables are standard for the Fama and French (1998) model. The control 
variables capture current investor expectations about firm performance, cash flow and 
investment. Equation (4) controls include past change (t-2), current and future change (t+2) of 
earning before extraordinary items plus interest, R&D expense, dividends, interest expense, 
future market value, and past and future change in assets. All variables in equation (2) are 
divided by total assets. Prior findings of Lev & Radhakrishnan (2005) indicate the market 
expectation of the contribution to future abnormal earnings from the current stock of OC is 2.4 
years. This fits relatively well with the Fama French (1998) technique of two year leads and lags 
on explanatory variables. 
 
MVi,t/TAi,t = α + β1OCi,t + β2OCi,t-2 + β3OCi,t+2 + β4Earningsi,t/TAi,t + β5Earningsi,t-2/TAi,t + 
β6Earningsi,t+2/TAi,t + β7R&Di,t/TAi,t + β8R&Di,t-2/TAi,t + β9R&Di,t+2/TAi,t + 
β10InterestExpensei,t/TAi,t  + β11InterestExpensei,t-2/TAi,t + β12InterestExpensei,t+2/TAi,t + 
β13Dividendsi,t/TAi,t  + β14Dividendsi,t-2/TAi,t + β15Dividendsi,t+2/TAi,t + β16MVi,t+2/TAi,t  + 
β17(TAi,t - TAi,t-2)/TAi,t + β18(TAi,t+2 - TAi,t)/TAi,t + Industry fixed effects + εi,t  (4) 
 
The results of the firm value procedure are shown in Tables 7 and 8. We find that OC is 
significant and positively associated with firm value, and is robust to the regression specification, 
controls and operationalization of OC. PU has a negative association with firm value, and high 
(4th quartile) PU has a larger negative and significant include on firm value than periods of low 
PU. This is in line with findings in prior literature. The interaction of OC and PU is positively 
 46 
 
associated with firm value at the 10% level. The quartiled PU interaction with OC shows a 
highly significant (p<0.01) and positive relationship between firm value and OC in periods of 
elevated policy uncertainty. We find OC is almost always a significant contributor to firm value, 
especially so PU is high. The results indicate that all else equal, a 1 standard deviation in OC is 
associated with a 35 bp increase in firm value, and 23 bp increase in firm value in periods of high 
PU. The economic significance of OC to firm value is similar to changes in leverage, assets, and 
future firm value. It is less economically relevant than earnings, dividends and R&D. Hypothesis 
2 is well supported by firm value regression results shown in table 8. Organization capital is 
significantly and positively associated with firm value in the context of PU. 
 
1.4.4. Instrumental Variable Robustness Test 
Estimating effects of organization capital on firm risk taking and financial policy risks violating 
the zero conditional mean assumption of our estimation procedure: the error term has an 
expected value of zero and is not correlated to OC. It is possible that high quality managers 
choose to work for firms with the most sensible financial policy and most attractive investment 
plan. Atkeson & Kehoe (1994) model OC as jointly produced with output. Most empirical 
finance literature deploy an instrumental variable approach to account for potential endogeneity 
of OC. Li, Qui & Shen (2018) use state-level variables inevitable disclosure doctrine (“IDD”) 
and unemployment insurance benefits (“UIB”) to instrument for organization capital. In order to 
match a firm to state level IDD and UIB data we must establish the location of the firm. Pirinsky 
& Wang (2006) ask the research question if corporate HQ location matters for returns. The study 
uses state-level Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia based economic indices to account for the 
observed local co-movement in stock prices. The state-level data is merged into the sample based 
 47 
 
on the headquarter state in Compustat. Likewise, we take the firm state variable in our sample to 





OC 0.1032* 0.1351*** 0.0816 0.1305*** -0.1502 0.7119*** 2.1729*** 0.7269***
(0.0585) (0.0301) (0.0625) (0.0305) (0.4073) (0.1867) (0.4872) (0.1928)
dOC 0.0908 0.0570 0.1008 0.0445 1.1454** 0.2976 -0.6090*** 0.1833*
(0.1043) (0.1026) (0.1058) (0.1026) (0.4783) (0.4785) (0.2304) (0.1035)
dOC2 0.0060 0.0730 0.0419 0.0731 0.3710 0.5746 0.4320* 0.5894***
(0.1267) (0.1220) (0.1246) (0.1205) (0.4413) (0.4082) (0.2448) (0.1054)
quartilePU_1 -0.0556 0.0609* -0.0936 0.1731**
(0.0447) (0.0320) (0.0670) (0.0673)
dquartilePU_1 0.0202 0.0149 0.1443*** 0.0502
(0.0216) (0.0157) (0.0286) (0.0329)
dquartilePU_12 -0.0261 0.0232 -0.0166 0.1993***
(0.0267) (0.0168) (0.0329) (0.0364)
quartilePU_4 -0.1323*** -0.0500** -0.2221*** 0.0090
(0.0305) (0.0222) (0.0366) (0.0597)
dquartilePU_42 -0.0187 -0.0049 -0.0328 -0.0615*
(0.0194) (0.0137) (0.0203) (0.0362)
OC_quartilePU_1 0.0891*** 0.0950*** -0.7074** 0.1755
(0.0227) (0.0250) (0.3097) (0.2081)
dOC_quartilePU_1 -0.0112 -0.0032 0.4437*** -0.3416***
(0.0106) (0.0113) (0.1277) (0.0919)
dOC_quartilePU_12 0.0256 0.0565*** -0.1825 -0.3855***
(0.0158) (0.0172) (0.1585) (0.1204)
OC_quartilePU_4 0.1154*** 0.1076*** -0.1671 0.0794
(0.0244) (0.0299) (0.2017) (0.1824)
dOC_quartilePU_4 -0.0553*** -0.0300* -0.2095*** -0.3169***
(0.0099) (0.0161) (0.0497) (0.0548)
dOC_quartilePU_42 0.0105 0.0195 -0.0535 0.0142
(0.0128) (0.0137) (0.1217) (0.1044)
PU -0.0000 0.0001* -0.0001** 0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
dPU -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
dPU2 0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
OC_PU 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0005* -0.0010***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003)
dOC_PU -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0006*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
dOC_PU2 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Constant 0.1567 0.1972*** 0.0686 0.2053*** 0.5577*** 0.4597*** -0.3409** -0.1130
(0.1273) (0.0695) (0.1081) (0.0672) (0.1356) (0.0864) (0.1716) (0.0943)
Observations 26,879 26,879 26,879 26,879 19,583 19,583 23,780 23,780
Number of gvkeynum 3,269 3,269 3,269 3,269 2,675 2,675 2,464 2,464
R-Squared 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.498 0.499 0.397 0.398
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7: Firm Value regression with dependent variable and controls following Fama & French (1998), and four variants of organization 
capital.




OC Variables = 
OC 0.1763*** 0.1032* 0.1351*** 0.1763*** 0.0816 0.1305***
(0.0297) (0.0585) (0.0301) (0.0297) (0.0625) (0.0305)
dOC 0.0172 0.0908 0.0570 0.0172 0.1008 0.0445
(0.1035) (0.1043) (0.1026) (0.1035) (0.1058) (0.1026)
dOC2 0.0992 0.0060 0.0730 0.0992 0.0419 0.0731























PU -0.0002*** -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
dPU -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
dPU2 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0001*** 0.0001**































Constant 0.1530** 0.5117*** 0.1567 0.1972*** 0.2649** 0.2005*** 0.5117*** 0.0686 0.2053*** 0.0194
(0.0668) (0.1004) (0.1273) (0.0695) (0.1187) (0.0660) (0.1004) (0.1081) (0.0672) (0.1160)
Observations 26,879 37,854 26,879 26,879 26,879 26,879 37,854 26,879 26,879 26,879
Number of gvkeynum 3,269 4,469 3,269 3,269 3,269 3,269 4,469 3,269 3,269 3,269
r2_o 0.415 0.374 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.415 0.374 0.417 0.417 0.416
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OC= Perpetual inventory method. OC=Inventory adjusted perpetual inventory method.
Table 1.8 Panel A: Regression of firm value on OC, PU and controls following Fama & French 1998. Explanatory variable of interests are OC, and 




OC Variables = 
OC 0.6673*** -0.1502 0.7119*** 0.8250*** 2.1729*** 0.7269***
(0.1428) (0.4073) (0.1867) (0.1882) (0.4872) (0.1928)
dOC 0.1825 1.1454** 0.2976 0.0442 -0.6090*** 0.1833*
(0.4975) (0.4783) (0.4785) (0.1021) (0.2304) (0.1035)
dOC2 0.6493 0.3710 0.5746 0.5513*** 0.4320* 0.5894***























PU -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0002** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
dPU -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
dPU2 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0001 -0.0000*































Constant 0.3508*** 0.5117*** 0.5577*** 0.4597*** 0.7308*** -0.0938 0.5117*** -0.3409** -0.1130 0.1588
(0.0855) (0.1004) (0.1356) (0.0864) (0.1325) (0.0937) (0.1004) (0.1716) (0.0943) (0.0991)
Observations 19,583 37,854 19,583 19,583 19,583 23,780 37,854 23,780 23,780 23,780
Number of gvkeynum 2,675 4,469 2,675 2,675 2,675 2,464 4,469 2,464 2,464 2,464
R-Squared 0.492 0.374 0.498 0.499 0.497 0.395 0.374 0.397 0.398 0.400
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8 Panel B: Regression of firm value on OC, PU and controls following Fama & French 1998. Explanatory variable of interests are OC, and 
OC interacted with policy uncertainty.
OCc = 5-Year Straight Line Depreciation FE = Firm Efficiency (Demerjian et al., 2012)
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IDD and UIB are both relevant to organization capital and both are assumed to be exogenous to 
the firm. Appendix table A2 lists correlations of instruments. In Chicago, IL there is a non-profit 
called the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”, founded 1982). The purpose of the ULC is to 
draft legislation that can be implemented by individual states to reduce state-to-state variation in 
legal precedent. The ULC promulgated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) in 1979 
(https://www.uniformlaws.org). Part of the USTA is expressed in a legal theory of inevitable 
disclosure suggesting employees that depart a firm for another, are assumed to inevitably 
disclose the secret intellectual property of the prior firm. While all states except for NC and NY 
have adopted USTA, far fewer recognize IDD. For example, California, Virginia and Florida 
totally reject the IDD precedent. States that adopt IDD into employment law precedent restrict 
the movement of certain types of employees from one firm to another. Firms located in states 
with IDD are more likely to invest in organization capital given tighter restriction on movement 
of firm know-how to a rival. Our review of current IDD precedent results in 20 instances of 
IDD=1 in our sample. We calculate maximum weekly unemployment benefits by state based on 
data obtained from fileunemployment.org. The theory and empirical findings linking UIB and 
OC indicates that the level of unemployment benefits available to employees is negatively 
associated with voluntary job switching and positively associated with employee skill 
acquisition. Higher levels of UIB mean employees don’t feel as great a need to switch jobs 
proactively to avoid unemployment (Light & Omori, 2004). Firms headquartered in states with 
higher level of UIB are expected to invest more in OC.  
 
In the first stage of our instrumental variable analysis we regress IDD and maximum UIB 
(“UI_max”) on each of the four formulations of OC as shown in equation (5). The residuals from 
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estimating equation (5) are saved and used in the second stage as the instrument for OC 
(“OChat”). We re-estimate all regressions with the four formulations of OChat.  
 
OC it = β0i + β1iIDD it + β2iUI_max it + β2iControlsit + Industry FE + Year FE + εit     
(5) 
 
The risk-taking, financial policy and payout 2SLS regression results are shown in table 9, 10 and 
11, respectively. In addition, we replace OC with OChat, re-estimate our firm value coefficients 
and show the results in table 12. Overall the instrumental variable results are broadly consistent, 
and in certain cases stronger, than results based on equations (3) and (4). OChat is positively and 
significantly associated with capital spending when controlling for quartiles of PU. The 
association of OChat with R&D, EBITDA volatility is significant and positive. Other estimates 
of the effect OChat on firm risk taking are less conclusive. Financial policy associations are 
stronger with OChat. OChat is positively and significantly associated with firm leverage across 
all base model specifications, and negatively and significantly associated with cash holdings 
across all specifications. The cash holding result with OChat is different compared to OC. This 
again points to a future empirical question about the relationship between OC and exogenous 
cash. Instrumental variable estimators of the effect of OC on shareholder payouts are negative 
and significant across 10 of 13 models. The consistency of the results with base regressions 
further point to high OC firms allocate less excess cash flow to shareholder payouts and more to 





1.5. Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
Firms with high organization capital take more risk in periods of policy uncertainty. The 
magnitude of the partial effect of OC on risk taking changes little based on quartile of OC. 
Further, the coefficient of the interaction term of OC*PU is positive and significant, suggesting 
that in periods of uncertainty some of the additional investment activity and risk taking of the 
firm is attributable to managers taking advantage of opportunity that may be created by 
uncertainty. Hypothesis 1 is supported by our results. Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou (2013) indicate 
labor in high OC firms have a partial claim on excess cash flow. The consistency of the results 
between base regressions and 2SLS estimations indicate that high OC firms have lower payouts, 
higher leverage and similar or lower levels of cash holdings. Certainly some of the excess cash 
flow is being allocated to capex (which is a capital item). However, it appears that high OC firms 
do in fact allocate a higher share of excess cash flow to employees. 
 
OC is a significant contributor to firm value, particularly when PU is high (p<0.01). The partial 
effect of OC on firm value is robust to formulation of OC and PU controls. The economic 
significance of OC to firm value is in line with the influence of leverage, assets, and future firm 
value. It is less economically relevant than earnings, dividends and R&D. Using a 2SLS 
procedure with exogenous instruments for OC show consistent, and somewhat statistically and 
economically stronger results. Overall, hypothesis 2 is well supported by firm value regression 
result. Organization capital is significantly and positively associated with firm value in the 
context of PU. 
 
1.5.1 Implications for Academics. 
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Controlling for PU, high OC firms have significantly higher ROA and EBITDA volatility than 
low OC firms. This leads to future research questions regarding OC and earnings management. 
Using a S,G&A based measure of OC, Chemmanur et al. (2009) show OC is associated with 
lower information asymmetry suggesting that high OC firms do a better job of communicating 
with stakeholders than low OC firms. This finding supports a future empirical study to determine 
if OC is negatively associated with earnings management and financial statement comparability. 
The association of OC and Cash was not clearly established. In base regressions there was a 
small positive, weakly significant association between OC and Cash. However, in the 
instrumental variable regressions OChat was shown to be significantly and negatively associated 
with cash holdings. The latter result appears more consistent with agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, prior finance literature includes several procedures to predict 
exogenous cash (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson, 1999)(Fresard, 2010). Future research 
could more precisely specify a research design to study the association of OC and cash holdings 
in the face of exogenous firm stressors.  
 
1.5.2 Implications for Practitioners 
OC enhances firm value in periods of uncertainty. Driving to eliminate fixed costs that promote 
development of firm intangible assets will harm the firm. This conclusion is consistent with Li, 
Qui & Shen (2018) and anecdotal observations from Kraft Heinz. Fixed cost is not the place to 
focus M&A synergies or cost cutting programs. Rather invest in organization capital and 
maximize variable cost leverage by cutting variable operating expenses. This may be counter-
intuitive, but the conclusion follows Krugman (1979) model of internal increasing returns to 
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scale in a straightforward way. High OC firms create more variable cost leverage and better 
returns to scale.  
 
1.5.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations in our study, with two being particularly noteworthy. First, studies 
on OC need to account for potential endogeneity in the research design. The instrumental 
variables used, following prior literature, are U.S. state specific data on legal doctrine and 
unemployment benefits. This limits our study to U.S. based firms. Second, we use Policy 
Uncertainty as an exogenous firm stressor to examine the influence of OC on firm decisions and 
firm value. PU affects all firms at the same time. PU cannot be used directly as a continuous 
variable in single country firm value calculations. The Fama MacBeth (1973) procedure omits a 
constant variable in the cross-sectional regressions. As there is no variation in the PU ‘x’ for 
























ORGANIZATION CAPITAL, PRODUCT MARKET STRESS AND FINANCIAL SLACK 
 
Abstract 
Agency theory implications regarding financial slack (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) are not in 
conflict with a product market view of slack (Benoit, 1984). This study integrates finance and 
economics theory (Krugman, 1979)(Jensen, 1986)(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990)(Atkeson & 
Kehoe, 1994) to empirically test whether firm investment in the intangible asset organization 
capital (“OC”) is associated with the product market benefits of cash. Consistent with the 
product market view, univariate tests show high OC firms operate in industries more likely to 
experience product market strain, have higher cash holdings (“EC”), take more risk, have lower 
leverage, lower total shareholder payouts and higher future growth prospects. Multivariate 
regressions show low OC firms hold more cash than high OC firms and that market share 
concentration and import intensity are positively associated with cash. The agency view of cash 
and product market view are not in conflict. Product market conditions influence the cash policy 
of risk averse managers. Controlling for product market conditions, high OC firms hold less 
financial slack than low OC firms. Firm value regressions (Fama & French, 1998) show OC and 
cash holdings are positively associated with firm value. Product market stress is negatively 
associated with firm value. Findings are robust to alternative measures of organization capital, 






Managers at General Electric made some attempt to conceal the fact former CEO Jeffrey Immelt 
was known internally to travel with two corporate jets1. Once reported, the two-jet arrangement 
was said to be for the CEO’s travel surety and safety. Corporate jet travel, much less a two-jet-
per-CEO arrangement, is a costly example of agency costs (Yermack, 2006) endemic to the 
modern corporate form. Approximately one year on, GE hired its new CEO away from Danaher. 
Danaher describes its Danaher Business Systems (“DBS”) as a unique firm process for driving 
culture, performance and success. The DBS is an example of firm investment in Organization 
Capital (“OC”). All firms possess some amount of intangible fixed asset organization capital 
(“OC”). The OC investment of firms may be active or passive, and strategic or tactical. The 
example of Danaher Business System (“DBS”)2 is an active and strategic investment in OC. The 
success of DBS is what resulted in long-time CEO Larry Culp Jr. being hired by General Electric 
to resuscitate its fortunes. In this study organization capital is defined as firm investment in 
formal and informal processes and systems to enhance productivity and value creation. 
 
As sensational as a two-jet discovery at a former Dow Jones Industrial Average (“DJIA”) firm 
may be to the financial press, abuse of corporate perquisites is not new to academics. It is also 
not adequate on its own to motivate new research questions about financial slack and firm value. 
However, theory and empirical findings about the effect of financial slack on firm policy and 
value are not uniform. Agency costs associated with holding too much cash are reported in 
literature beginning shortly after elucidation of the theory of the firm in Jensen & Meckling 





in part attributed to prior literature on the product market view of cash. The product market view 
identifies the positive influence of financial slack on product market performance and market 
share (Benoit 1984)(Fresard, 2010). Conflict in empirical findings regarding the influence of 
cash on investment policies, financial policies and firm value was predicted by Bolton & 
Scharfstein (1990).  
 
Huang, Jain & Kini (2019) show industry tournament-based compensation incentives (“ITI”) 
increase cash holdings and the value of cash holdings. The study uses product market 
competition as an exogenous stressor. Resolving all conflicting implications of agency theory 
and the product market view of financial slack is not the focus of this paper. However, the solid 
theoretical and empirical associations demonstrated in prior literature of product market 
performance and financial slack make the former an appropriate exogenous factor to relate to 
new research questions regarding the potentially endogenous latter regressor (slack).  
 
Prior literature has utilized M&A as an exogenous variable to identify the influences of OC (Li, 
Qui & Shen, 2018) and cash flow (Lang, Stulz & Walkling, 1991) on firm performance and 
value.  Lang et al (1991) use Tobin’s Q to control for the growth prospects of a firm when 
empirically testing for post-acquisition bidder performance. Li, Qui & Shen (2018) demonstrate 
superior post-deal performance of firms investing in OC. To extend the literature we focus on 
product market stress and OC. This paper is intended to empirically determine if high OC firms 
facing product market stress hold more cash, and if it enhances firm value? This study is the first 
to: 1) relate OC to product market stress, and 2) seek to reconcile and integrate product market 




In order to extend the insights of Huang, Jain & Kini (2019) and Li, Qui & Shen (2018) and 
answer the research question of this study we draw upon four streams of literature. The resultant 
hypotheses and empirical results indicate product market stressors act on firm behavior in a 
similar manner to compensation contracts, and what may be predicted by agency theory. This 
study further assists in resolving conflicting theoretical predictions of Bolton & Scharfstein 
(1990).  
 
Four streams of motivating literature include: 1) Agency theory – The separation of ownership 
and control results in monitoring costs and manager incentives to retain excess cash, overinvest, 
and spend on management perquisites (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Alternatively, risk averse 
managers may underutilize cash, choosing to manage the firm for lower risk and lower returns 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). 2) The product market view of cash implies an incentive to 
hold cash as a precaution to enable firms to maintain investment plans and optimal financial 
policies during periods of elevated competitive stress (Huang, Jain & Kini, 2019) (Fresard, 
2010). Cash may also act as a deterrent to predation or altogether prevent new competitive entry 
(Benoit 1984)(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). 3) Economic theory establishes that fixed costs 
internal to a firm result in the potential for positive economies of scale (Krugman, 1979). OC is a 
fixed firm intangible asset. 4) Recent finance studies employ several measures of organization 





We find the agency view of cash and product market view are not in conflict. Univariate tests 
show high OC firms operate in industries under greater product market strain. Top quartile OC 
firms are associated with lower market share concentration (Hirschman-Herfindahl index 378 vs 
478, p<0.001), higher import intensity and a higher propensity to be influenced by tariff cuts. 
High OC firms are characterized by a greater investment in R&D. OC itself is a fixed intangible 
investment, analogous to R&D investment for innovation. In our study high OC firms and low 
OC firms did not exhibit material differences in acquisition spending.  
 
Multivariate regressions across four formulations of OC, three formulations of cash and five 
product market variables indicate OC is positively associated with financial slack. However, 
when controlling for product market stress, and the interaction of OC and product market stress, 
OC association with EC becomes negative. An overall positive association of OC and financial 
slack appears due to the omission of a product market stress control. Multivariate regressions 
controlling for product market stress, with high and low OC dummy variables, consistently show 
low OC firms hold more cash than high OC firms, and market share concentration and import 
intensity are associated with higher cash. Product market conditions influence firm slack as 
expected. However, the effect is in the context of agency theory as controlling for product 
market conditions, we find high OC firms hold less EC than low OC firms. The combined effect 
is consistent with agency theory. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature on 
agency theory, financial slack, the product market view of cash, a trade-based model of fixed 
costs, firm performance, and the theoretical foundations and empirical measurement of OC. 
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Section 3 details our sample and empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses results and of main 
regressions and robustness tests. Section 5 offers conclusions and implications for academics and 
practitioners.  
 
This study contributes to the body of literature on organization capital, financial slack, agency 
theory and product markets. It is most closely tied to literature on organization capital, clearly 
identifying OC and its effects as a fixed intangible asset of the firm. 
  
2.2. Literature Review 
Bolton & Scharfstein (1990) develop a model of rational predation to approach to the question of 
product market stress and financial policy, leverage and financial constraints. Rival pricing or 
market entry actions have less impact on product market performance as firms are less 
financially constrained to pursue investments. Similarly, Benoit (1984) indicates product market 
benefits of cash as competitors are dissuaded from aggressive pricing tactics less likely to 
succeed, or from market entry altogether.  
 
2.2.1 Mixed picture of financial slack. 
Financial slack may aid firm product market performance by funding new investment out of cash 
on the balance sheet rather than external capital markets.  Using inside equity makes it more 
likely managers overcome natural risk aversion and make positive NPV investments. Managers 
are risk averse agents of firm owners, and while lower slack may limit the private benefits 
managers extract it also may limit the financial flexibility of a firm to make value-creating 
investments. Said differently, a firm may pass on a positive net present value investment due to 
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insufficient inside equity. The level of risk aversion rises as new capital is required to fund new 
investments.  
 
Risk sensitivity of CEOs is demonstrated in both directions by Edmans and Liu (2011) and 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). Edmans and Liu (2011) show a positive association between 
inside debt in CEO compensation packages, and risk aversion. In the other direction, Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) found that the risk seeking behavior of CEOs was positively 
associated with compensation package sensitivity to firm stock volatility.  
 
Agency conflicts between managers and owners are thought to be most severe as financial slack 
exceeds any reasonable assumed level needed to fund positive NPV projects (Jensen, 1986). 
Managers incentive to overinvest (Richardson, 2006) means that inside equity may be used on 
negative NPV projects unless governance incentives channel firm resources in a more productive 
way. Lang & Litzenburger (1989) demonstrate that financial policy decisions of the firm, 
specifically increasing dividends, may have a significant restraining influence on 
overinvestment. In the research design of Lang & Litzenburger (1989) Tobin’s Q is deployed to 
split the sample into over-investors (Q<1) and firms with attractive future growth prospects. 
Dividend announcements may include a confound, as it signals future earnings prospects and 
growth, raising Q, rather than purely reducing a risk of cash misuse (Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Lang, Stulz & Walkling (1991) take the investigation further and find support for the 
overinvestment hypothesis. Lang et al consider investment activities of the firm, namely large 
acquisitions. In controlling for growth prospects (Tobin’s Q) the study showed that higher free 




The issue of limited financial slack leading to a less than optimal investment policy is formally 
identified within pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf , 1984). Pecking order predictions 
regarding how firms finance new investments has not been consistently supported by empirical 
testing. A generalized hierarchy theory of funding has been found to have support in some 
studies. Amihud, Lev & Travlos (1990) find that control-oriented insiders use inside equity 
(slack) and debt before outside equity.  Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) show 
well performing firms hold more slack than static tradeoff models predict. Static trade off models 
identify the benefit of holding cash relative to the costs as a push and pull of transaction cost 
motives and precautionary motives (Keynes, 1934). Opler et al use data from 1971-1994 to show 
cash holdings and investment opportunities are positively associated, and firms with excess cash 
typically reduce slack to cover losses rather than to fund fixed investment or acquisitions. An 
important prediction of the static trade off model is large firms require less cash on hand as large 
firms typically have better access to external capital markets.  
 
Precautionary motives of cash holdings extends to firm management of labor. Ghaly, Dang & 
Stathopoulos (2017) consider how reliance on skilled labor influences financial policy. The 
linkage of skilled labor, or labor heterogeneity, to financial policy is labor adjustment costs 
(Shapiro 1986). Labor adjustment costs include severance, search times, productivity and 
training. Ghaly identifies a significant and large influence of labor heterogeneity on cash. A one 
standard deviation in labor force skill was associated with a 21% increase in cash/assets. Low 
skill firms exhibited a 13.6% cash/asset ratio, and a high skill firms 26%. The results strongly 
suggest firms hold precautionary cash to avoid turnover of skilled labor when cash flow shocks 
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occur. The precautionary motive of cash holdings has similarities to a predation model indicating 
the benefits of cash to product market performance. 
 
The flexibility motive of excess cash is also identified in prior literature. A survey of CFOs 
indicates financing flexibility is important to firms (Graham & Harvey, 2001). Financial 
flexibility is not directly observable. It may be defined as financial slack, total leverage or 
unused debt capacity (Arslan-Ayaydin et al. 2014)(Ferrando et al, 2014). Yung, Li & Jian (2015) 
define financial flexibility as a minimum of three consecutive years of unused debt capacity. 
Yung et al (2015) find corporate financial flexibility helps firms maintain investment programs. 
Financial flexibility is associated with higher future firm risk taking (de Jong et al, 2012). 
Financial flexibility in the form of internal capital markets, has been shown to add to firm value 
in a financial crisis (Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2015). The flexibility motive construct overlaps 
with precautionary motives and are rooted in the risk aversion of agent-managers (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Firms do not want a financial market shock to reduce future investment 
programs. This issue is particularly acute in emerging markets where capital markets are not as 
deep or globally integrated (Yung et al, 2015). 
 
Conflicts in prior literature regarding the influence of financial slack may be attributable in part 
to the endogeneity of cash and the empirical challenge of identifying the exogenous portion of 
slack (Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 1999)(Fresard, 2010). Exogenous cash (“EC”) is a 
measure of cash holdings instrumented for unknown endogenous factors correlated to 
independent variables on interest in the regressions, including variation based on firm and 
industry fundamentals. In general, the benefits of high cash holdings on product market 
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performance may be offset by higher agency related costs. Firms that hoard cash, and use 
internal equity for funding are subject to less external monitoring. This is a result of a lower need 
to access external capital markets. Firms with high cash holdings are not as likely to keep 
investors well informed and would have higher cost of information asymmetry. Firms with high 
levels of financial slack are also more likely to waste firm resources through managerial 
perquisites and overinvestment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)(Jensen, 1986).  
 
Prior literature is not conclusive on the importance of the level of cash and access to capital on 
the ultimate investment level of the firm and perceived future expected growth (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997 and 2000)(Fazzari, Hubbard, Peterson 1988 and 2000).  An important finding in 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1998) shows that high cash flow, rather than high free cash flow, is 
associated with a high valuation. Antunovich (1996) and Opler and Titman (1994) identify 
additional variables with explanatory power regarding cash holdings. Excess slack is positively 
associated with information asymmetry and high R&D. It may be that markets assess the 
prospects of firms with high cash flow and higher investment activity differently than firms with 
high free cash flow due to low investment opportunity. 
 
Bolton & Scharfstein (1990) predicts the potential for conflicting results given agency-oriented 
costs offset product market benefits. Further, rivals act to influence the agency relationship 
between external creditors and the firm in order to constrain firm product market actions. The 
model does not constrain principal-agent problems, as both the principal and agent are influenced 
by each other’s decisions. Financial structure is shown to influence cost of capital and 
profitability, indicating that financial policy decisions of the firm may influence firm value when 
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facing product market stress. The capital market benefit is rival firms are less likely to engage in 
predatory product market behavior, absorbing the related cost to profitability, if the target firm 
does not need to access external capital markets to continue to invest. The trade-off we address 
in our research design is financial contracts and structure that deter predation, addressing product 
market stress, at the same time increase potential principal-agent incentive problems.  
 
The joint dependence issue in common in corporate finance studies. Dammon & Senbet (1988) 
indicate real and financial policy decisions are often jointly dependent. The empirical challenge 
of dealing with the simultaneity of firm decisions leaves unanswered research questions. As a 
result of opposing influences of excess cash on real and policy decisions of firms, this study is 
narrowly focused on considering previously ignored firm assets or attributes that shed light on 
the true influences of financial slack. Our research question deals with financial policy jointly 
with product market performance and firm intangible organization capital. 
 
MacKay & Phillips (2005) considered a joint dependency issue of how industry influences 
capital structure, as well as the market share and investment implications. The paper went 
beyond Myers & Majluf (1984) pecking order theory of capital structure to consider industry 
peer influence. The dependent variables in the paper are leverage, capital-labor ratio, and cash 
flow volatility. Findings showed only 13% of leverage variation due to industry, 54% is firm 
level effects, and 33% is within firm variation.  
 
2.2.2. Compensation contract incentive tests extend to OC 
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Within the product market benefit stream, ITI’s have consistently been shown to enhance the 
value of cash (Phan, Simpson & Nguyen 2017)(Huang, Jain & Kini 2019). CEO industry 
tournament incentives (“ITI”), controlling for exogenous product market stressors, are positively 
associated with the level of cash a firm holds, and its value of cash (Huang, Jain & Kini, 2019). 
ITI causally increases the value of cash by the channel of strategic CEO risk taking. The 
additional risk taking is a function of added ITI investment incentives, ultimately resulting in 
product market benefits for the firm. Phan, Simpson & Nguyen (2017) looks directly at ITI and 
the value of corporate cash, finding that ITI is positively related to cash level and the marginal 
value of cash holdings. 
 
This study extends Huang et al (2019) and Phan et al (2017) by considering if investment in 
organization capital influences firm behavior and the level and value of cash in a manner similar 
to, or different from, compensation contracts. ITI suppresses agency costs of cash to unlock 
product market benefits of cash. Prior studies appear to imply a horse race between competing 
agency and product market views. We view the conclusions differently as all factors appear to 
modify the predictions of agency theory, explained by competing incentives of risk averse 
agents.  
 
Prior literature has not dealt with the question as to whether high organization capital firms 
suffer the negative consequences to the same degree, of misappropriation of firm resources that 
excess slack may cause. Organization capital is an intangible fixed asset intended to improve the 
efficiency with which a firm converts its resources, including cash, into output. In the same way 
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ITI suppress the risk aversion of managers, OC should be positively associated with more 
efficient use of EC, higher risk taking and ultimately enhanced firm value.  
 
Theory leading to the identification of firm intangible OC begins with an assumption 
shareholders and skilled managers each have a claim on excess firm cash flow. The relative share 
of excess cash is based on the effect of a productivity shock on firm performance. Skilled 
managers could choose to depart for a new firm (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). The skilled 
labor capital productivity shock risk is conceptually similar to physical plant capital shocks. Each 
form of capital must earn a return for the corresponding risk, resulting in corresponding risk 
premia. To operationalize the OC shock effect Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou (2013) use S,G&A. 
S,G&A is the most direct accounting measure of the association of OC and the corresponding 
risk premia. S,G&A is now commonly used in empirical studies and is assumed to represent 
firm-wide investment in formal and informal training, apprenticeships, mentoring, information 
technology (“IT”), senior management compensation expense not attributed to line manager cost 
of goods sold, ESG spending (environment, social and governance), consulting, HR recruiting 
and retention efforts, firm-level community service initiatives, and corporate philanthropy.  
 
We regard prior OC literature as specific when supported by individual accounting line items, 
demographics of management or the firm, and third-party surveys. The most common specific 
measure of OC in prior literature is based on capitalized S,G&A expense (Chan, Lakonishok & 
Sougiannis, 2001)(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013)(Li, Qui & Shen, 2018). Unlike physical plant 
and equipment, S,G&A is not capitalized, and is not reported as an asset on the balance sheet. If  
S,G&A is to measure a firm intangible asset OC that contributes to efficient conversion of inputs 
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to sales, it need be capitalized following prior literature (Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis, 2001).  
A brief summary of prior specific and general OC literature is given in figure 1. 
 
Figure 2: Specific and General Organization Capital and Management Skill 
 
 
Lev & Radhakrishnan (2005) develop a model to address the hard to measure and tacit elements 
of OC. Firms may have an expected output based on the inputs of employees, physical capital, 
and investment in innovation. If firms outperform (underperform) expected output, it is due to 
the adequate (inadequate) firm-specific stock of intangibles. To improve upon a general 
approach Lev & Radhakrishnan capitalize S,G&A to proxy for residuals of a total factor 
productivity model. Firms don’t systematically report investments in OC such as training 
expenditures, retention spending leading to higher average tenure, or brand enhancement 
activities outside of advertising. However, those items are consolidated into S,G&A and may be 
measured, in an industry specific way.  
 
Organization Capital Management Skill
Specific
Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005                             
Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, 2012                        
Chemmanur, Paeglis, & Simonyan, 2009                        
Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013.                               
Li, Qui & Shen, 2018
Chevalier & Ellison, 1999                                
Betrand & Schoar 2003,                                     
Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007                                                                                                      
Bloom & Van Reenen 2010
General
Evenson & Westphal, 1995                           
Brensnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2002             
Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005              
Demerjian, Lev & McVay, 2012
Murthi, Choi & Desai, 1997                          
Demerjian, Lev & McVay, 2012   
Albequerque, De Franco & Verdi, 2013                
Delis & Tsionis, 2018
 69 
 
Intangible firm assets are measured indirectly in other streams of literature. The most common 
example may be R&D expense and patent filings as proxies for innovativeness (Balsmeier, 
Fleming & Manso, 2017)( Bhattacharya, Hsu, Tian & Yu, 2017) (Luong, Moshirian, Nguyen, 
Tian & Zhang, 2017)(Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh, 2012).  It is straightforward to conceptualize 
S,G&A well represents firm-level investment in efficiently converting inputs to sales and profits. 
Capitalized S,G&A as a proxy for OC continues to gain traction in the literature. Li, Qui & Shen 
(2018) show OC to be causally and positively associated with bidder post-deal cost synergy, 
innovation, performance and asset turnover.  
 
An alternative to a capitalized S,G&A measure of OC, or to third-party data (Computerworld IT 
100 for example) is to construct generalized measures. General OC measures are supported in 
theory assuming payments to an OC asset are always positive, are positively associated with 
entry costs, and are a function of market structure. Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) construct a total 
factor productivity model of OC assuming perfect competition, discrete time, and a return to OC 
of variable profit minus fixed costs. The expertise that one plant embodies in comparison to 
another is OC. Instead of assuming perfect competition, Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) then use a 
market structure of imperfect competition, showing an increase in returns to OC owners. Returns 
to OC are a function of market structure.  
 
The relevance of market structure to returns on OC is an important element of the motivation for 
the research question of this study. Accordingly, three of the five measures of product market 
condition relate to market structure. Atkeson & Kehoe use macroeconomic data, namely national 
accounts profit, to estimate intangible capital share of payments exceed tangible capital by 10%. 
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Data envelopment analysis is also used in literature to measure general OC. An example is the 
firm efficiency score of Demerjian, Lev & McVay (2012). The study uses data envelopment 
analysis (“DEA”) to define firm efficiency as residuals from a linear regression or firm inputs 
and output. General OC measures may also consider broad industry or nation level inputs. We 
use the general OC measure firm efficiency for a robustness test.  
 
Intangible capital has been considered in economic development literature. Evenson & Westphal 
(1995) have a common notion that tacit knowledge is a firm intangible, difficult to measure and 
difficult to transfer. The review undertaken is most concerned with the economic development 
implications of R&D in less developed countries. Nations have endogenous processes of 
technological change to potentially take advantage of growth and innovation opportunity. 
Investment in country-level and firm-level technology infrastructure is required to develop the 
industrial technology and organization capital required to compete. However, included in the 
required infrastructure investment are experience and knowledge of how to combine capital and 
labor for productive outcomes. Evenson & Westphal encourage future empirical research to fill 
in voids in understanding management processes that may improve productivity. OC is a 
construct falling squarely within that mandate. 
 
2.2.3 OC is an intangible fixed asset leading to increasing returns. 
OC is a firm investment in intangible fixed assets that open up the possibility of increasing 
returns to scale. Krugman (1979) modeled trade based on as assumption of positive fixed costs, 
thereby opening up new trade theory. Prior to Krugman, trade had been explained based on the 
Ricardian concept of comparative advantage heterogeneity (Ricardo, 1817). New trade theory 
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establishes that similar countries will engage in trade due to increasing returns to scale derived 
from positive fixed cost. Krugman’s work resulted in the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences. The analysis of ‘trade patterns and economic activity’2 contains a crucial lesson for 
firms. Firms that invest in OC have an opportunity outperform peers.  
 
Krugman (1979) has been extended in economics literature from a country level unit of analysis, 
to firm-level, and plant level. Clerides, Lach & Tybout (1998) develop a firm level model of  
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/advanced-economicsciences2008.pdf 
international trade. The theoretical and empirical objective of the paper is to sort out the direction 
of causality for success in export markets. The cause could be either experience-based learning 
leading to greater export success, or more efficient firms self-selecting to export markets. The 
study finds firm efficiency is the causal element for firms to choose to be exporters. Bernard,  
Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003) explain dramatic differences in plant level productivity. The 
model implies producers with the highest efficiency have the largest cost advantage. This is an 
important finding for an OC study in at least three respects. First, certain firms have internal 
processes apart from learning via international trade that make them more efficient than 
competitors. Second, it links to empirically based conclusions of Li, Qui & Shen (2018). Bidder 
firms that perform best post-closing cut variable costs, and invest in fixed intangibles. Third,  
Bernard et al (2003) associates firm efficiency with product market performance.  
 
Prior literature has provided a clear path and remaining gap for the research question and H1 of 
this study: Agency costs with excess cash flow are well known. The costs can be mitigated with 
compensation contracting (Huang et al, 2019)(Lazear & Rosen, 1981)(Kale, Reis & 
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Venkateswaram, 2007) and may even be justified with precautionary motives to avoid labor 
productivity shocks (Ghaly et al, 2017) or discourage rational predation in product markets 
(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990)(Fresard, 2010)(Huang et al, 2019). The product market linkage to 
cash shows benefits to firm risk taking and firm value (Fresard, 2010)(Huang et al, 2019). 
Further, organization capital is a function of market structure and (Atkeson & Kehoe, 1994) and 
is separately associated with product market performance (Bernard et al, 2003).  
 
H1: OC negatively mediates the association of financial slack and product market stress. 
 
2.2.4. Firm value is influenced by intangible fixed asset investment. 
The firm value question regarding firm cash policy, filtered through Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) indicates that even if OC does mediate EC and PM stress, both parts may not be relevant 
to firm value. OC can be regarded as firm investment in a fixed intangible asset. The riskiness 
and hard to reverse nature of OC investment implies it should be awarded a risk premia (Zhang, 
2005). We expect OC to be significantly associated with firm value. The compensation for the 
firm level risk of costly to reverse investments has been cited in previous literature as the source 
for a ‘high-minus-low’ factor risk premium (Zhang, 2005)(Fama & French, 1992).  Finance 
literature operationalizes OC as a fixed intangible asset by capitalizing S,G&A using a perpetual 
inventory method (Chemmanur, Paeglis & Simonyan, 2009) (Eisfeldt & Papnikolaou, 2013) (Li, 
Qui & Shen, 2018). The stock of firm OC depreciated at 15%-20% per year is more easily 
reversible than structures depreciating over 40 years. As such OC should realize a payment from 
firm cash flow according to its particular irreversibility risk (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005). Firms 
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making investment in tangible and intangible fixed assets incur the risk of costly reversibility and 
variation in cost of capital.  
 
The firm value effect of EC is considered separately from intangible fixed asset OC. Fama & 
French (1998)(“FF98”) was based on a self-described ad hoc approach (not based in theory) to 
test the relevance of financial policy to firm value. Prior theory and literature had concluded that 
investment decisions are relevant to firm value (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). However, taxes 
and financing decisions were not expected to be shown to be consistently relevant to firm value. 
FF98 show that an all but investment irrelevancy conclusion is overstated.  
 
There is a growing body of literature indicating financial policy has a significant bearing on firm 
value. A study with predicted optimal financial slack (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 
1999) uses FF98. The Fama & French approach was deployed to test firm value relative to 
corporate cash and dividend policy (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006).  Dividend policy 
changes were found to carry positive information about the future prospects of a firm. Dittmar & 
Mahrt-Smith 2007 use FF98 to show well governed firms have a higher marginal value of cash. 
Earnings management policy is significantly associated with firm policy with significant 
influence on firm value (Yung & Root, 2019). In the context of product market studies, cash 
holdings was shown to be positively and significantly associated with firm value. In each case 
the authors use FF1998 as a base, with modifications to empirically test the research question of 
interest. We expect both EC and OC to have a significant influence on firm value in the context 




H2: OC is positively associated with firm value in periods of PM stress. 
 
2.3. Research Design. 
 
2.3.1 Sample. 
We obtain data from Compustat via Wharton Research Data Services, for the years 1998-2017. 
We exclude utilities, financials and ADRs. We eliminate firms under $5mln market value or 
revenue, or a share price under $2. Firms with missing data reported for fyear, revenue, assets or 
shares outstanding are also dropped form the sample. Following prior empirical OC studies we 
set to zero missing values for R&D, S,G&A and interest expense. Negative values for capital 
spending, acquisitions, R&D, cash, dividends, share repurchases, and interest are set to zero. We 
winsorize relevant continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
Summary statistics are presented in table 1. The final sample for the study is 66,008 firm years. 
The average (median) firm has $2.65 billion ($373million) in assets, market value of $3.34 
billion ($461 million) and revenue of $2.33 billion ($347 million). The sample exhibits an 
average firm size somewhat smaller than Li et al ($3.18 billion), Huang et al ($5.07 billion in 
assets) and Phan et al ($4.13 billion). The right-hand skew in firm size leads us to take the 
natural log of asset, and use the result as a control variable in our panel regressions.  Mean 
(median) ROA, MTB and trailing one-year sales growth for the sample are 2.4% (4.3%), 3.3 
(2.1), and 14.5% (8.0%), respectively. Relevant comparisons from Li et al reveal similar 
profitability and future growth prospect with reported sample ROA and MTB of 2.8% (4.0%) 
and 3.6 (2.3). Risk-taking characteristics of our sample are similar to Huang et al. Capex to 
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assets for 54,495 firm years average (median) 0.07 (0.04) compared to 0.07 (0.05) in Huang. 
Acquisitions to assets are 0.05 (0.00) compared to 0.03 (0.00). Huang reports R&D relative to 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Firm level data is combined with macroeconomic and product market measures. Following 
Fresard (2010) we use the North America Industrial Classification system for tariff data and 
Herfindahl-Hirshman index scores. From the U.S. International trade commission website we 
download available tariff and market concentration data for the years 1998-2017.  An annual CPI 
deflator is derived from monthly consumer price index data (fred.stlouisfed.org). In order to 
estimate a two-stage least squares model two instrumental variables are recommended from prior 
literature. First, a dummy variable is used to identify states adopting inevitable disclosure 
doctrine (“IDD”) laws. In our data fifteen states have an IDD law variable set to 1 for the entire 
sample period. An additional five states have IDD turned on from 0 to 1 during the sample 
period. The second instrumental variable is maximum weekly unemployment insurance benefits. 
The maximum benefit is a product of weeks eligible and weekly benefit. The data is acquired 
from https://fileunemployment.org/unemployment-benefits/unemployment-benefits-comparison-
by-state.html. The maximum state level benefit and IDD is merged into the main sample by the 
compustat ‘state’ variable and by year. The governance control in the study is a state level 
Business Combination (“BC”) law dummy variable. A state that adopts BC law precedent limits 
a large deals or merger transactions between a firm, related parties and new minority 
shareholders for a period of time (http://people.duke.edu/~charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglosb.htm). 
We record thirty instances of state level BC precedent. Firm Efficiency (“FE” or “FirmEffic”) 
scores are obtained from Demerjian’s website (http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html). 
The average (median) firm efficiency score is 0.33 (0.28).   
 
2.3.2 Organization Capital 
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We assume that S,G&A is indicative of firm investment in efficiency and capitalizing S,G&A 
represents intangible fixed asset OC (Li, Qui & Shen, 2018)(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). Li 
et al note any noise in S,G&A expense from items not oriented to OC biases the study against 
identifying significant associations. Three alternative measures of OC capitalize S,G&A directly, 
and the fourth is a general measure of OC. The fourth measure is a DEA-based general measure 
of firm efficiency taken directly from the website of Peter Demerjian (Demerjian et al, 2012). 
The main calculation for OC uses a perpetual inventory method. The method is perpetual as if a 
firm ceases S,G&A investment altogether, OC would decline but never reach zero. Li et al and 
calculates the initial stock of OC (1) and each subsequent year OC balance (2). 
 
OCi,0 = realSGA/ATi,1/(sectorG+DeprOC)    (1) 
 
OCi,t = (1-DeprOC)OCi,t-1 + realSG&Ai,t/ATi,t   (2) 
 
S,G&A is deflated by total assets and CPI (fred.stlouisfed.org). Sector growth is the median 
compound S,G&A growth rate for a firm’s 2-digit GIC sector. We follow prior literature and the 
bureau of economic statistics standards for R&D capital and use a 15% depreciation rate of OC.  
 
The main effects of the regression results reported in section 4 following use industry median 
adjusted OC (“OCb”). Industry financial reporting conventions vary, and S,G&A accounts are 
most comparable intra-industry. Industry median OC at the 2-digit level is subtracted from firm-
level OC. The third method of calculating OC (“OCc”) is 5-year straight line depreciation. This 
method follows Li et al (2018) and also Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis (2001) in calculating a 
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R&D asset. If a firm completely ceases S,G&A spending its stock of OCc would be zero six 
years on. The fourth measure is a robustness check on our S,G&A based measures. Demerjian 
(2012) provides data on his website for a DEA- based general measure of Firm Efficiency that is 
becoming common in the literature.  
 
We obtain 50,358 observations of unadjusted perpetual inventory OC and industry adjusted OC 
(OCb), and somewhat fewer (34,396) five year trailing straight line observations of OC (OCc). 
The average (median) OC is 1.90 (1.44) and average industry adjusted OC is 0.40 (0.00). This is 
somewhat higher than the unadjusted average (median) OC reported by Li et al is 0.97 (0.69). 
This is in part due to our average firm being much smaller, and a negative and highly significant 
correlation between OC and firm size (table 2.2). Li also reports a negative and significant 
pairwise correlation coefficient for OC and firm size.  
 
 
2.3.3 Exogenous Cash 





















































































































































































































































































































































 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
1. Exogenous cash ("EC") is the predicted value of cash from the panel regression specificaiton cheAT = Bo + B1*TANG + B2*L1.cheAT + B3*L2.cheAT + epsilon, with industry and year fixed effects on: following Fresard (2010).
2. EC1 is exogenous cash predicted following Opler et al (1999).
3. TANG is asset tangibility calculated as: TANG = 0.715*rect/L1.at + 0.547*invt/L1.at + 0.535*ppent/L1.at. This Approach follows Berger, Ofek & Swary (1996).
4. OC is organization capital calculated using perpetual inventory method. OCb is industry median adjusted OC. OCc is calculated using straight line depreciation. MA is managerial ability per Demerjian et al (2012).
5. CUT 2 requals 1 if cash tariff rate declined by two or more times the median change in industry tariff rate, per 109 NAICS industry sectors with US ITC data (https://dataweb.usitc.gov/).
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We follow prior literature to calculate three measures of cash as dependent variables in our main 
regressions. The cash holdings model of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson is widely used, 
including in Phan, Simpson & Nguyen (2017) and Huang, Jain & Kini (2019). Instead of 
modifications to consider tournament-based incentives, we modify the procedure to include OC. 
The specific procedure it to use a first stage and regress firm cash/assets on the control variables 
of Opler, obtain predicted values for cash (“EC1”). We winsorize EC1 at the 1% level to ensure 
results are not unduly influenced by outliers. An alternative formulation of exogenous cash 
follows Fresard’s (2010) use of lags of cash and asset tangibility as instrumental variables. Asset 
tangibility is calculated as a combination of receivables, inventory and net property, plant & 
equipment, all standardized by prior period assets (Berger, Ofek & Swary, 1996). We regress 
firm cash/assets on asset tangibility, and two lags of cash, while also keeping industry and year 
fixed effects on. Due to the assumed exogenous nature of asset tangibility, the predicted value of 
cash/assets becomes an alternative formulation of exogenous cash (“EC”). Tangibility is not 
expected to be associated with product market performance of a firm, but it is considered 
associated with cash and controls such as leverage. The mean level of EC to assets is 0.18, 
somewhat lower than total cash/assets of 0.20. We winsorize EC at the 1% level to avoid undue 
influence from outlier observations. The final cash formulation is cash/assets, used as a 
robustness check on the exogenous measures of slack. 
 
2.3.4 Product Market stress. 
2.3.4.1 Import Intensity & Tariff Cuts 
We measure product market stress from the perspectives of trade and industry concentration. We 
calculate trade-based product market measures to obtain a continuous measure, and a dummy 
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variable that can deployed for a quasi-natural experiment. Of note, data availability is better for 
the CUT2 dummy than for IMPINT. For IMPINT manufacturing data only covers 85 of 109 
NAICS sectors of the CUT2 variable. In terms of years, we obtain 1997-2016 for imports, but 
total value, the denominator for IMPINT, is available only from 2002 through 2016. This shrinks 
the number of observations in import intensity regressions to 19,529, relative to 33,655 for tariff 
cut regressions. Following prior literature import intensity (“IMPINT”) is the value of imports 
divided by domestic sales plus imports, minus exports. The value of goods shipped covered in 
the data base is approximately $6 trillion. The mean (median) import intensity is 0.36 (0.34).  
 
We follow Fresard and Huang et al to calculate a product market variable to conduct a quasi-
natural experiment. Tariff rates are equal to calculated duties divided by the customs value of 
imports. Tariff rates lowered by more than two times the median annual change constitute an 
exogenous product market shock for firms (“CUT2”). Assuming the tariff rate does not rise in 
the following year, tariff cut shock years are coded as ‘1’. Tariff data is available at 
https://dataweb.usitc.gov for 109 NAIC sectors. The resulting data covering 20 years and 109 
industries yields 2071 possible ( (20-1)*109 ) industry year CUT dummy variable observations. 
The customs data and product market strain methodology registers 667 CUT2 dummy variables 
= 1, using a 2x median standard. Varying the standard of tariff cut shock to 2.5x median yields  
623 = 1, and 567 for a 3x median standard.  
 
2.3.4.2 Industry structure.  
In prior product market literature market structure and concentration is measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (“HHI”)(Huang et al, 2019)(Fresard, 2010)(Mackay & Phillips, 
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2005). HHI is relevant to our research design as motivating theory links market structure to 
predicted effects of organization capital, financial slack, returns and firm value (Atkeson & 
Kehoe, 1994)(Krugman, 1979)(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). We follow Mackay & Phillips 
(2005) and collect NAIC industry level HHI scores from the United States Census Bureau. The 
Census Bureau report on industrial manufacturers is produced every five years. The HHI score in 
the report is paired with firm-years in our data set at t0 plus and minus two years. This approach 
to coding is adequate as we observe 9 total changes in industry structure status, out of 172 
possible transitions (4% change rate). The mean (median) HHI score in our sample is 382.6 
(316.5) with 20,883 total firm year observations. 
 
In addition to using a continuous measure of HHI, we code industries into concentrated or 
competitive. The industry structure dummy variable coding follows U.S. Department of Justice 
competition guidelines and prior literature (Fresard, 2010). An industry with a concentrated 
dummy set at 1 (“CONC”) has a HHI score above 1800. For context an industry with three firms 
at 25% or more market share would have a HHI > 1875 (3*252). Approximately 2% of the firm-
years in our sample are coded with a CONC dummy turned on. A concentrated industry most 
closely resembles an oligopolistic market structure. The competitive market structure dummy has 
a HHI below 1000 (“COMP”). The COMP variable is in the direction of monopolistic 
competition or perfect competition market structures. The concentrated dummy also serves as an 
empirical indicator to identify the industry structure assumed in Krugman (1979). 
 
2.3.5 Pairwise correlations 
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We report pairwise correlations for key variables in table 2.2. The significance of  is reported 
by testing if  is significantly different from zero using a t-distribution with n-2 degrees of 
freedom. The three measures of cash are positively and significantly correlated, with asset 
tangibility and firm size being negatively associated with all measures of cash. In our sample OC 
is positively associated with R&D spending, not significantly correlated with acquisitions and 
exhibits a small negative, but significant, correlation with capex. Li et al does not separately 
report OC correlations with measures of firm investment. OC is positively and significantly 
correlated with MTB and ROA, but does not have a significant pairwise association with trailing 
1-year stock return. The three measures of cash are positively and significantly associated with 
MTB, and as expected, negatively and significantly associated with ROA.   
 
2.4. Results 
Our identification strategy revolves around using multiple formulations of cash, organization 
capital and product market stress. The objective is to minimize endogeneity issues to bake in as 
many robustness tests as possible. The endogeneity of cash has been widely dealt with in Finance 
literature by using multiple measures. This study uses reported cash scaled by assets, as well as 
two-stage instruments for cash following Opler et al (1999) and Fresard (2010). The endogeneity 
of OC is handled by using four alternative constructions of OC, and instrumental variables for 
each of the four constructions to re-estimate all multivariate and firm value equations. Product 
market stress is an exogenous factor. However, to draw stronger conclusions, and avoid 
misinterpreting potentially countervailing indications of the product market view and agency 




2.4.1 Univariate analysis. 
OC is used to denote a perpetual inventory, unadjusted, measure of firm fixed intangible 
organization capital. The calculation follows formulas (1) and (2). OCb denotes industry adjusted 
OC. Five-year straight-line depreciation organization capital, denoted by OCc throughout, has 
32% fewer observations than OC or OCb. A DEA-based firm efficiency score is shown as either 
FirmEffic, FE or in the case of an instrument for FirmEffic, FEhat. The univariate analysis is 
conducted by splitting the sample into first (low) and fourth (high) quartiles of organization 
capital. The four panels of table 3 correlate to one of the four measures of organization capital. 
The three cash variables in table 3 (EC, EC1 and Cash/Assets) are dependent variables used in 
turn in multivariate regressions that follow. 
 
A univariate analysis indicates cash holdings, industry structure, investment policy, financial 
policy and operating fundamentals of high OC firms is significantly different from low OC 
firms, and more oriented to investment and future growth. Quartile 4 OC firms hold significantly 
more cash than low OC firm (p<0.01). The difference in cash holdings is between 70% and 
258%, depending on the measure of central tendency used. Panel D shows the univariate analysis 
with Firm Efficiency as the dependent variable. For FE the cash balance measures have different 
signs, and a much narrower range overall. This is an indication that FE as a general measure has 
different characteristics than S,G&A specific measures of OC. Across three specific measure of 
OC, high OC firms are significantly more likely to operate in less concentrated, more 
competitive, industries (Q4OC HHI = 378.5 versus Q1OC = 477.7). Panel D shows an additional 
difference with higher efficiency firms operating in less competitive industries.  Import intensity 
is higher with unadjusted measures of OC. However, OCb (Panel B) indicates a somewhat lower 
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level of import intensity for high OCb firms, once industry conditions are controlled for. High 
OC firms are shown to invest more heavily in R&D and exhibit higher cash flow and ROA 
volatility. Industry adjusted capital spending is higher for high OC firm. Acquisition spending 
does not appear different between high and low OC quartiles. Consistent with prior literature, in 
terms of financial policy, high OC firms have less leverage, more net working capital and a 
lower total payout (dividends plus buybacks). Financial policy shows an additional distinction 
between specific measures of OC and DEA based FE. High efficiency firms have higher 
leverage, lower net working capital and higher total shareholder payout. While high OC firms are 
smaller than low OC firms, consistent with prior literature, they are found have higher future 






Table 2.3 Panel A: Univariate analysis with perpetual inventory method of Organization Capital
Q4_OC (high) Q1_OC (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value)** (p-value)***
OC 4.413 (3.723) 0.218 (0.2)
Cash and Product Market Strain
CUT2 0.341 (0) 0.29 (0) 0.000 0.000
HHI 378.469 (313) 477.703 (364.3) 0.000 0.000
IMPINT 0.375 (0.331) 0.305 (0.297) 0.000 0.000
CONC 0.016 (0) 0.007 (0) 0.001 0.002
COMP 0.936 (1) 0.919 (1) 0.018 0.000
TANG 0.35 (0.337) 0.393 (0.399) 0.000 0.000
EC (Fresard, 2010) 0.234 (0.193) 0.131 (0.07) 0.000 0.000
EC1 (Opler et al, 1999) 0.214 (0.199) 0.113 (0.084) 0.000 0.000
Cash/Assets 0.258 (0.201) 0.152 (0.056) 0.000 0.000
OC_CUT2 1.441 (0) 0.064 (0) 0.000 0.000
OC_HHI 1497.732 (1087.134) 117.9 (81.086) 0.000 0.000
OC_IMPINT 1.452 (1.22) 0.075 (0.051) 0.000 0.000
OC_CONC 0.05 (0) 0.001 (0) 0.000 0.000
OC_COMP 3.715 (3.332) 0.24 (0.261) 0.000 0.000
Investment Policy and Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.061 (0.041) 0.097 (0.054) 0.000 0.000
R&D/TA 0.087 (0.033) 0.037 (0) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.046 (0) 0.048 (0) 0.393 0.022
St Dev ROA 0.215 (0.053) 0.058 (0.031) 0.000 0.000
St Dev EBITDA 0.296 (0.138) 0.139 (0.117) 0.000 0.000
Financial Policy
Net WorkingCapital/Assets 0.069 (0.113) -0.039 (-0.007) 0.000 0.000
Leverage 0.453 (0.407) 0.556 (0.567) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.007 (0) 0.03 (0) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales0.029 (0.001) 0.058 (0.013) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 18.304 (9.041) 23.727 (8.506) 0.001 0.045
ROA* 0.002 (0.045) 0.018 (0.034) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.192 (0.13) 0.129 (0.12) 0.099 0.000
MTB 4.545 (2.805) 2.944 (1.952) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.609 (3.758) 5.035 (3.586) 0.000 0.000
LnAT 5.063 (4.958) 7.027 (6.997) 0.000 0.000





Table 2.3 Panel B: Univariate analysis with quartiles of industry median adjusted organization capital.
Q4_OCb (high) Q1_OCb (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value)** (p-value)***
OCb 2.667 (1.989) -1.191 (-1.162)
Cash and Product Market Strain
CUT2 0.342 (0) 0.314 (0) 0.002 0.002
HHI 325.854 (262) 458.458 (364.3) 0.000 0.000
IMPINT 0.357 (0.314) 0.384 (0.391) 0.000 0.000
CONC 0.003 (0) 0.028 (0) 0.000 0.000
COMP 0.963 (1) 0.922 (1) 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.367 (0.354) 0.301 (0.284) 0.000 0.000
EC (Fresard, 2010) 0.211 (0.157) 0.201 (0.128) 0.000 0.000
EC1 (Opler et al, 1999) 0.19 (0.168) 0.191 (0.169) 0.475 0.710
Cash/Assets 0.236 (0.164) 0.214 (0.111) 0.000 0.000
OCb_CUT2 0.857 (0) -0.383 (0) 0.000 0.000
OCb_HHI 764.192 (473.386) -539.874 (-421.082) 0.000 0.000
OCb_IMPINT 0.791 (0.559) -0.447 (-0.41) 0.000 0.000
OCb_CONC 0.005 (0) -0.034 (0) 0.000 0.000
OCb_COMP 2.182 (1.715) -1.075 (-1.057) 0.000 0.000
Investment Policy and Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.065 (0.041) 0.058 (0.033) 0.000 0.000
R&D/TA 0.077 (0.016) 0.054 (0) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.047 (0) 0.047 (0) 0.889 0.000
St Dev ROA 0.241 (0.049) 0.053 (0.031) 0.000 0.000
St Dev EBITDA 0.322 (0.137) 0.125 (0.109) 0.000 0.000
Financial Policy
Net WorkingCapital/Assets 0.08 (0.127) -0.021 (0.006) 0.000 0.000
Leverage 0.466 (0.424) 0.522 (0.522) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.007 (0) 0.015 (0) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales0.028 (0.001) 0.053 (0.009) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 17.745 (8.833) 19.412 (7.905) 0.091 0.000
ROA 0.007 (0.049) 0.011 (0.035) 0.086 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.245 (0.137) 0.104 (0.115) 0.001 0.000
MTB 4.454 (2.677) 3.073 (2.06) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.646 (3.698) 4.83 (3.46) 0.000 0.000
LnAT 5.056 (4.958) 6.8 (6.681) 0.000 0.000





Table 2.3 Panel C: Univariate analysis with 5 year straight line depreciation organization capital.
Q4_OCc (high) Q1_OCc (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value)** (p-value)***
OCc 0.459 (0.406) 0.033 (0.032)
Cash and Product Market Strain
CUT2 0.281 (0) 0.245 (0) 0.000 0.000
HHI 354.22 (290.7) 512.83 (425.8) 0.000 0.000
IMPINT 0.395 (0.343) 0.302 (0.288) 0.000 0.000
CONC 0.014 (0) 0.013 (0) 0.757 0.757
COMP 0.952 (1) 0.892 (1) 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.334 (0.332) 0.381 (0.394) 0.000 0.000
EC (Fresard, 2010) 0.214 (0.171) 0.126 (0.073) 0.000 0.000
EC1 (Opler et al, 1999) 0.203 (0.183) 0.116 (0.087) 0.000 0.000
Cash/Assets 0.224 (0.172) 0.122 (0.055) 0.000 0.000
OCc_CUT2 0.126 (0) 0.009 (0) 0.000 0.000
OCc_HHI 156.62 (112.848) 20.423 (13.983) 0.000 0.000
OCc_IMPINT 0.171 (0.141) 0.012 (0.008) 0.000 0.000
OCc_CONC 0.005 (0) 0 (0) 0.000 0.282
OCc_COMP 0.427 (0.382) 0.038 (0.045) 0.000 0.000
Investment Policy and Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.049 (0.035) 0.087 (0.05) 0.000 0.000
R&D/TA 0.062 (0) 0.019 (0) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.035 (0) 0.036 (0) 0.696 0.000
St Dev ROA 0.156 (0.048) 0.056 (0.031) 0.001 0.000
St Dev EBITDA 0.234 (0.133) 0.136 (0.117) 0.001 0.000
Financial Policy
Net WorkingCapital/Assets 0.099 (0.127) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 0.000
Leverage 0.456 (0.421) 0.573 (0.575) 0.000 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.008 (0) 0.028 (0.004) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales0.036 (0.007) 0.056 (0.018) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 7.689 (5.849) 12.626 (6.232) 0.000 0.103
ROA 0.03 (0.05) 0.032 (0.037) 0.408 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.254 (0.132) 0.141 (0.12) 0.026 0.000
MTB 3.523 (2.34) 2.752 (1.88) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 4.648 (3.322) 4.915 (3.462) 0.051 0.000
LnAT 5.816 (5.725) 7.566 (7.576) 0.000 0.000





2.4.2 Multivariate analysis. 
In turn, dependent variables in the multivariate regressions are exogenous cash following Fresard 
(2010) and OPSW (1999). The series of regressions to test hypothesis 1 are given in the set of 
Table 2.3 Panel D: Univariate analysis with managerial ability (Demerjian, 0212) used to measure organization capital construct.
Q4_FE (high) Q1_FE (low) Means Difference Medians Difference
Mean (median) Mean (median) (p-value)** (p-value)***
Firm Efficiency**** 0.537 (0.474) 0.195 (0.208)
Cash and Product Market Strain
CUT2 0.329 (0) 0.324 (0) 0.541 0.541
HHI 480.377 (364.3) 346.561 (275.1) 0.000 0.000
IMPINT 0.361 (0.336) 0.323 (0.312) 0.000 0.000
CONC 0.027 (0) 0.006 (0) 0.000 0.000
COMP 0.905 (1) 0.947 (1) 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.35 (0.339) 0.382 (0.387) 0.000 0.000
EC (Fresard, 2010) 0.178 (0.12) 0.142 (0.088) 0.000 0.000
EC1 (Opler et al, 1999) 0.149 (0.112) 0.168 (0.153) 0.000 0.000
Cash/Assets 0.181 (0.105) 0.154 (0.077) 0.000 0.000
FE_CUT2 0.176 (0) 0.062 (0) 0.000 0.541
FE_HHI 275.641 (197.876) 70.482 (50.829) 0.000 0.000
FE_IMPINT 0.195 (0.168) 0.065 (0.062) 0.000 0.000
FE_CONC 0.017 (0) 0.001 (0) 0.000 0.000
FE_COMP 0.48 (0.441) 0.193 (0.211) 0.000 0.000
Investment Policy and Risk Taking
Capex/TA 0.07 (0.042) 0.066 (0.036) 0.007 0.000
R&D/TA 0.052 (0.003) 0.034 (0) 0.000 0.000
Acquisitions/TA 0.049 (0) 0.031 (0) 0.000 0.000
St Dev ROA 0.048 (0.028) 0.069 (0.041) 0.000 0.000
St Dev EBITDA 0.134 (0.119) 0.134 (0.112) 0.974 0.000
Financial Policy
Net WorkingCapital/Assets 0.043 (0.041) 0.083 (0.093) 0.000 0.000
Leverage 0.536 (0.537) 0.513 (0.485) 0.006 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.019 (0.003) 0.008 (0) 0.000 0.000
Dividend+Repurchase/Sales0.064 (0.028) 0.022 (0) 0.000 0.000
Operating Fundamentals and Performance
Sales Growth 18.344 (7.696) 7.934 (4.612) 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.072 (0.068) -0.029 (0.012) 0.000 0.000
EBITDA/TA 0.186 (0.167) 0.048 (0.082) 0.000 0.000
MTB 4.05 (2.847) 2.238 (1.475) 0.000 0.000
Tobin's Q 5.75 (4.293) 3.666 (2.621) 0.000 0.000
LnAT 7.75 (7.827) 5.004 (4.846) 0.000 0.000
Trailing 1 Year Return 11.432 (5.014) 7.656 (-1.87) 0.000 0.000
*ROA standard deviation and EBITDA/TA variables calculated with 5 year rolling window.
**equal variance t-test that difference is means not equal to zero.
*** Pearson chi-squared test where the null hypothesis is median of Q4 is not greater than Q1.
****Taken from Demerjian et al. (2012).
Assets, market cap, revenue, s,g&a, mtb, sales growth, 1 year trailing return, roa, Tobin's Q, all winsorized at the 1st,99th percentiles.
S,G&A, R&D, acquisitions, capex, common dividends, interest expense and cash holdings all set to zero if negative.
Note: The pearson chi^2 median test statistic returns the number of firms greater then the median in the given quartile and tests the null
hypothesis that the proportion of observations greater than the median is not different between OC quartile 1 and quartile 4.
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formulas (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7). In each random effects, generalized least squares panel 
regression equation, the PMStress variable is operationalizes as OC, CUT2, IMPINT, HHI, 
COMP and CONC. 
 
EC it = β0i + β1iOC it + β2iControlsit + Industry FE + Year FE + εit           (3)           
 
EC it = β0i + β1iPMStressit + β2iControlsit + Industry FE + Year FE + εit           (4)    
 
EC it = β0i + β1iOC it + β2iPMStressit + β3iOC it ∗ PMStressit + β4iControlsit + Industry FE +
Year FE + εit           (5)           
 
EC it = β0i + β1iOC it + β2iQ1_PMStressit +  β3iQ4_PMStressit  +  β4iQ1PMStress it ∗ OC it ∗
OC it  +  β5iQ4PMStress it ∗ OC it   + β6iControlsit + Industry FE + Year FE + εit           (6)           
 
EC it = β0i + β1iPMStress it + β2iQ1_OC it  +  β3iQ4_OC it   +  β4iQ1OC it ∗ PMStress it + 
β5iQ4OC it ∗ PMStress it   + β6iControlsit + Industry FE + Year FE + εit           (7)           
 
The main regression results presented in table 4 use industry adjusted OCb as the explanatory 
variable of interest. Panel A in each case is exogenous cash following Fresard, Panel B follows 
Opler et al (1999), Panel C follows Fresard (2010) with an instrumental variable for OC, and 
panel D follows Opler et al (1999) with a 2SLS instrumental variable approach for OC. 
Appendix tables 2, 3 and 4 included, but not discussed in detail, display results of regressions 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OCb -0.005 -0.022*** -0.012** -0.011** -0.031 -0.012** -0.009*





































quartileOCb_1 0.012* 0.033*** 0.013 0.016** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024)
quartileOCb_4 0.001 -0.028*** -0.018** -0.016** -0.034





















Constant 0.491*** 0.469*** 0.471*** 0.480*** 0.506*** 0.490*** 0.484*** 0.483*** 0.460*** 0.466*** 0.474*** 0.496***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025)
Observations 13,650 11,051 10,030 10,030 10,030 11,051 10,030 13,650 11,051 10,030 10,030 10,030
Number of gvkeynum 1,574 1,331 1,246 1,246 1,246 1,331 1,246 1,574 1,331 1,246 1,246 1,246
R-Squared 0.410 0.409 0.413 0.410 0.408 0.425 0.416 0.417 0.420 0.419 0.417 0.415
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4 Panel B: Dependent Variable Cash/Assets. Controls follow Opler et al (1999) and include ln(assets), MTB, net working capital/assets, capex/assets, EBITDA/Assets, 
leverage, cash flow volatility, R&D/sales, as well as distributions and acquisitions dummy variables. OCb calculated using industry adjusted perpetual inventory method. Year fixed 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The number of observations for each result presented in table 4 varies from 10,010 to 22,707, 
with R-squared of 34.6% up to 55.3%. Industry adjusted OCb with controls but no product 
market stress variables does not have a significant influence on exogenous cash. This result 
follows from the prior theory implication that highly efficient firms would, all else equal, not 
want to hold excess slack, but at the same time efficient firms may derive a product market 
benefit from excess cash. We find evidence of a product market motivation for cash with both 
export measures of product market stress and market structure variables. The CUT2 dummy is 
negatively associated with cash. Firms do not know about tariff shocks ex ante and excess cash is 
used to respond to the stress, in line with the indication by Opler et al (1999) that higher than 
average cash is used to cover operating losses. In conjunction with tariff cut shock effects and 
confirming a precautionary motive, import intensity is positively associated with cash. In terms 
of industry structure, firm concentration and HHI are positively and significantly associated with 
cash. The predictions of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) are confirmed as firms increase EC to 
strategically manage potential predation.  
 
Estimating equations (5) and (6) reveals a negative and significant association between OCb and 
EC. There are no changes to the sign and significance of any PMStress coefficients, compared to 
those estimated in equation (4). Interaction terms of OC and PMStress are all positively signed, 
with a significant association with the interaction term OC_IMPINT. The OC_IMPINT 
coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in OC_IMPINT is associated with a 2.9% increase in the 
ratio of EC/Assets. Together, estimating equations (5) and (6) indicate product market stress has 
a positive association with cash, restrained by a negative association with OC. The stock of OC 




When estimating equation (5) with the CUT2 dummy variable we may also interpret it with 
quasi-natural experiment logic. The CUT2 dummy identifies a point in time where an exogenous 
shock influences financial slack. Including the CUT2 dummy in the equation and the interaction 
term, causes the coefficient for OCb to represent the influence of organization capital on cash for 
firms not affected by a cut in tariff rates. The coefficient of OCb is negative and significant in the 
presence of the interaction terms with CUT2. The coefficient of the interaction term is the 
incremental effect of OC on the level of firms influenced by a tariff shock. We do not find a 
significant effect for the interaction term in our industry adjusted regression. OCb is negatively 
associated with cash, as it the CUT2 tariff shock dummy. However, we do not observe high OC 
firms incrementally adding to cash due to a tariff shock.  
 
Estimating equation (8) confirms the negative partial influence of OC indicated by results so far. 
Testing quartiles of OC with our various product market factors indicates low OC firms have 
significantly higher EC, and high OC firms hold significantly lower EC.  Hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed. OC acts as expected to improve firm efficiency by negatively mediating risk-aversion 
based product market stress impulses to raise or retain additional financial slack. 
 
2.4.2.2 Robustness tests included in multivariate analysis. 
Organization capital is a potentially endogenous variable such that estimating the association 
with cash may violate the zero conditional mean assumptions of linear regressions. The issue can 
be mitigated somewhat by avoiding pooled OLS which requires strict exogeneity for consistent 
estimators. It is possible that high quality managers bring OC with them when they choose to 
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work for firms with high cash balances, attractive future growth prospects, or strong market 
positions. Indeed, OC is modeled jointly with output by Atkeson & Kehoe (2005).  
 
We follow prior literature and re-estimate our regressions using instrumental variables for OC. 
Following Li et al (2018), our study includes IV’s state-level variables inevitable disclosure 
doctrine (“IDD”) and unemployment insurance benefits (“UIB”). Firm location is required to 
merge in state level instruments. Pirinsky & Wang (2006) establish that corporate HQ location 
can be used to merge state level variables. Pirinsky & Wang use state-level Philadelphia Fed 
economic indices to explain local co-movement in stock prices. Compustat state HQ is merged 
with state-level Philadelphia Fed data. Likewise, we merge firm-state UIB and IDD variables 
into our sample according to Compustat variable state.  
 
IDD and UIB are exogenous to the firm as no firm has direct control over unemployment 
insurance benefits or state-wide legal precedent. IDD and UIB are relevant to OC. Firms in states 
with IDD precedent have a greater incentive to invest in OC. Higher UIB reduces employee 
incentives to voluntarily change jobs to avoid periods of unemployment. The corollary is firms 
are more incented to invest in the employee and OC. 
 
In Chicago, IL the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”, founded 1982) drafts regulation and 
legislation to be enacted by individual states. The goal of the ULC is to increase uniformity of 
legal precedent. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) was put forward by the ULC in 1979 
(https://www.uniformlaws.org). The contained legal theory of inevitable disclosure says 
departing employees will inevitably disclose trade secrets and intellectual property of the 
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departed firm. 48 states have adopted the USTA (not NY and NC). However, only 20 have full 
recognized IDD. California, Virginia and Florida reject all elements of IDD. Adoption of IDD 
has the practical effect of restricting the inter-firm movement of employees with access to trade 
and process secrets. Firms operating in states with IDD are likely to invest more aggressively in 
OC, and its associated risk, as the restrictions on inter-firm worker movement makes earning a 
return more likely. We code IDD=1 for 20 states in our sample.  
 
Maximum weekly unemployment benefits are obtained from fileunemployment.org. The data is 
available at the state level to match with the firm state HQ variable in our main sample. UIB and 
OC are linked in prior literature as the level of unemployment benefits is negatively associated 
with voluntary job switching. UIB are positively associated with employee training and skill 
acquisition. If UIB are higher, firm employees would not have as high an incentive to proactively 
switch jobs to avoid periods of unemployment (Light & Omori, 2004). Employees that are less 
likely to quit incentivizes firms to invest more in training specifically, and OC in general.  
 
The first stage of the IV procedure regressed IDD and UI_max on each formulations of OC (8). 
The residuals from estimating equation (8) are saved. In the second stage we include the 
residuals as an instrument for OC (denoted “OChat” in tables). All regressions are re-estimated 
with the four formulations of OChat.  
 





The results of the 2SLS regressions are given in panels C and D. In general the results are highly 
consistent in terms of sign and significance. The coefficients are also larger. We interpret the 
increased magnitude of our 2SLS results conservatively. Jiang (2017) review of 225 finance 
papers notes that IV estimator coefficients are approximately an order of magnitude larger that 
base model estimates. We observe a similar result with our IV estimation. Regardless, the 
consistent sign and significance of Table 4 panels C and D with panels A and B do not in any 
way restrain the conclusion that hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 
2.4.3 Firm value regressions. 
With appropriate modifications we follow FF98 to estimate the firm value effects of OC while 
controlling for product market stress. FF98 has been used in prior literature as it is robust to 
various specifications. It has been used to estimate the influence of cash on firm value 
(Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson, 2006)(Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). The base line firm value 
regression given in formula (9) includes industry adjusted organization capital (OCb) and a 
measure of financial slack. Additional specifications of firm value regressions include interaction 
terms of OC and one of five product market stressors (CUT2, IMPINT, HHI, CONC, COMP). 
Each product market variable corresponds with table 5 panels A through E. 
 
MVi,t/TAi,t = α + β1OCi,t + β2OCi,t-2 + β3OCi,t+2 + β4ECi,t + β5ECi,t-2 + β6ECi,t+2 + 
β7Earningsi,t/TAi,t + β8Earningsi,t-2/TAi,t + β9Earningsi,t+2/TAi,t + β10R&Di,t/TAi,t + β11R&Di,t-
2/TAi,t + β12R&Di,t+2/TAi,t + β13InterestExpensei,t/TAi,t  + β14InterestExpensei,t-2/TAi,t + 
β15InterestExpensei,t+2/TAi,t + β16Dividendsi,t/TAi,t  + β17Dividendsi,t-2/TAi,t + 
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β18Dividendsi,t+2/TAi,t + β19MVi,t+2/TAi,t  + β20(TAi,t - TAi,t-2)/TAi,t + β21(TAi,t+2 - TAi,t)/TAi,t + 
Industry fixed effects + εi,t  (9) 
 
Control variables in equation (9) are standard for FF98. The control variables are intended to 
empanel investor expectations firm specific cash flow, investment and performance. Each 
control variable incorporate past, current and future trends with trailing a two-year change, 
current year value, and forward two-year change variable. Controls include past , current and 
future measures of earning before extraordinary items plus interest, R&D, dividends, and interest 
expense. Controls also include future market value, and past and future change in assets. All 
variables are scaled by total assets. Lev & Radhakrishnan (2005) use an abnormal earnings 
approach to estimate a market expectation on future abnormal earnings from current OC at 2.4 
years. The FF98 technique of two year leads and lags on explanatory variables fits well with this 
result. 
 
Across all five panels of Table 5, accounting for five product market variables OC is consistently 
positive and significant. Table 5, panel B results describe the association of OC and firm value 
controlling for import intensity. In the full sample regression, including controls for exogenous 
cash, import intensity and the interaction of import intensity and OC, industry adjusted OCb is 
positively and significantly (p<0.01) associated with firm value. A one standard deviation 
increase in OCb (1 s.d. = 1.82) equates to a 0.27% increase in excess firm value Firm value is 
defined as the excess of market value over book value, scaled by firm assets. The interaction 
term OCb_IMPINT is also positive and significant, at a similar magnitude to OCb. Cash is 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































own, as expected, the coefficient of IMPINT is negatively associated with firm value (p<0.01). 
The full sample regression explains 54% of the variation and the constant is not significantly 
different from zero. In splitting the sample into quartiles of OCb, we find the interaction term of 
OCb_IMPINT is not significant for low the low OCb group, but positive and highly significant 
in two of the three formulations of cash.    
 
Firm value regressions indicate that OC is positively associated with firm value when controlling 
for product market stress. H2 is supported. The firm value results follow from results supporting 
H1. OC has a negative influence on firm cash holdings, ostensibly making the firm more 
efficient and less subject to agency costs. Firm value is higher due to the efficiency and higher 
growth prospects, as well as being a reward for the risk incurred by making a difficult to reverse 
investment in intangible assets.  
 
2.5. Conclusions and implications for academics and practitioners. 
Agency oriented costs and benefits are managed and influenced by, among other things, 
compensation contracts, governance and product market conditions. The net effect of the 
incentives, endogenous and exogenous, is to induce firms to make specific investment and policy 
choices. MacKay & Phillips (2005) note that empirical research and theory don’t yet reveal the 
reasons behind intra-industry differences in firm financial and investment policy. In our study, 
OCb represents an industry median adjusted firm stock of intangible fixed assets driving firm 
operational efficiency. The findings of this study show that organization capital negatively 
mediates the significant association between product market conditions and financial slack. Prior 
studies have shown a linkage between product markets and financial slack, and theory about 
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product market stress is not new (Benoit, 1984)(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). Product market 
factors acts on firm cash policy through precautionary and rational predation motives. We 
consider financial policy decisions of risk averse agents dealing with product market stress to be 
a branch of the agency theory tree, rather than a distinct tree. The new finding of this study is 
firm drive for efficiency, resulting from a high relative stock of OC, restrains the positive and 
significant effect of product market stress on cash holdings. The robust, positive and, significant 
association of OC with firm value is clear. Firms benefit from investment in fixed intangible 
asset OC. The benefit of OC to a firm is in risk taking, growth potential and efficient use of 
assets. The return to OC is priced in capital markets, demonstrated in firm value regressions, and 
following, as predicted, theory of Zhang (2005), Krugman (1979) and Atkeson & Kehoe (2005). 
 
Implication for academics: 1) Evidence in this paper, and other recent finance literature (Li, Qui 
& Shen, 2018) confirm the significant influence on firms of intangible fixed asset OC. As the 
body of literature on organization capital grows, it may become a staple control variable in 
corporate finance and firm value models. The controls of most corporate finance models and 
firm value models include controls for the intangible asset R&D. In some instances R&D is a 
proxy for innovativeness, and in others for the risk of financial distress (Opler et al, 1999). There 
is growing evidence to suggest OC should be treated similarly. 2) The research question in this 
study considers the influence of OC on financial slack in the context of product market stress. 
However, our review of literature on financial slack did not find a satisfactory answer to a 
question we consider relevant. Does it matter where the cash came from? The question has been 
addressed in part. However, cash may be generated internally (inside equity) or from external 
capital markets, and in the form of debt, common equity or convertible instruments. The question 
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may be relevant given the causal link (Fresard, 2010) between cash and product market 
performance. 
 
Implications for practitioners: Organization capital is a fixed intangible asset of the firm. 
Investment in OC will improve the product market performance of the firm (Fresard, 2010) and 
make it a more efficient user of capital, delivering higher returns and future growth prospects. 
Corporate strategy should be oriented to cutting variable costs and investing in fixed intangible 
assets. The value of this contrary thinking is demonstrated by the firm value effects of OC in this 
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Table A1.1 Panel A2 - 2SLS - OC - Risk 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5
OChat -0.012 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.065*** 0.058***
(0.029) (0.012) (0.012) (0.034) (0.013) (0.014)
lnAT -0.012 -0.010*** -0.006 -0.008** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.005** 0.013*** 0.011** -0.004*
(0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
leverage 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.041***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
w_roa -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.028 -0.030
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Wmtb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cheAT 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.036*** 0.033** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.033**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
w_ret1 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_salesG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnAge -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.048*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.046***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
BC_Gov -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PU 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***



















Constant 0.349*** 0.318*** 0.254*** 0.316*** 0.306*** 0.395*** 0.540*** 0.211*** 0.280*** 0.513***
(0.081) (0.032) (0.061) (0.063) (0.030) (0.093) (0.037) (0.070) (0.071) (0.034)
Observations 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782
Number of gvkeynum 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139
R-Squared 0.152 0.149 0.151 0.151 0.150 0.0762 0.0645 0.0737 0.0753 0.0660
Robust standard errors in parentheses




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1.1 Panel B2  - 2SLS - OCb - Risk 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5
OCbhat -0.012 0.018 0.005 0.008 0.071*** 0.055***
(0.029) (0.012) (0.012) (0.034) (0.014) (0.014)
lnAT -0.012 -0.010*** -0.006 -0.008** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.005** 0.013*** 0.011** -0.004
(0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
leverage 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.040***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
w_roa -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.029 -0.031
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Wmtb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cheAT 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.036*** 0.033** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.034***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
w_ret1 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_salesG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnAge -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.048*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.047***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
BC_Gov -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PU 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***



















Constant 0.346*** 0.318*** 0.263*** 0.321*** 0.304*** 0.398*** 0.540*** 0.228*** 0.300*** 0.522***
(0.074) (0.032) (0.060) (0.060) (0.035) (0.085) (0.037) (0.068) (0.068) (0.040)
Observations 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782
Number of gvkeynum 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139
R-Squared 0.152 0.149 0.151 0.151 0.152 0.0762 0.0645 0.0740 0.0756 0.0666
Robust standard errors in parentheses























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1.1 Panel C2  - 2SLS - OCc - Risk 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5
OCchat 0.342 0.158 0.113 0.418 0.725*** 0.699***
(0.416) (0.160) (0.160) (0.443) (0.178) (0.178)
lnAT 0.008 -0.010*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.009*** 0.018 -0.005** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.004*
(0.021) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002)
leverage 0.001 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.029* 0.041*** 0.019* 0.019* 0.041***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
w_roa -0.072*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.044* -0.031 -0.054** -0.052** -0.031
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Wmtb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cheAT 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.035** 0.033** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
w_ret1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_salesG 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnAge -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.048*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.048***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BC_Gov -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
PU 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***



















Constant 0.179 0.318*** 0.237*** 0.280*** 0.312*** 0.239 0.540*** 0.134 0.179* 0.528***
(0.165) (0.032) (0.083) (0.082) (0.031) (0.178) (0.037) (0.093) (0.092) (0.036)
Observations 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782
Number of gvkeynum 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139
R-Squared 0.151 0.149 0.150 0.151 0.150 0.0758 0.0645 0.0702 0.0722 0.0650
Robust standard errors in parentheses









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1.1 Panel D2  - 2SLS - FE - Risk 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdROA5 sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5sdebitdaAT5
FEhat 0.400 0.065 0.019 0.454 0.059 0.007
(0.624) (0.051) (0.035) (0.634) (0.052) (0.035)
lnAT -0.023 -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.020 -0.005** -0.007*** -0.005* -0.006***
(0.022) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
leverage 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
w_roa -0.120 -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.097 -0.031 -0.038* -0.029 -0.033
(0.090) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.091) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
Wmtb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cheAT 0.045* 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.022 0.033** 0.032** 0.033** 0.033**
(0.027) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
w_ret1 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_salesG 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnAge -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BC_Gov -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PU 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000***



















Constant 0.306*** 0.318*** 0.320*** 0.351*** 0.319*** 0.396*** 0.540*** 0.549*** 0.568*** 0.544***
(0.043) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.050) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
Observations 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,821 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782
Number of gvkeynum 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139
R-Squared 0.153 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.149 0.0768 0.0645 0.0642 0.0669 0.0643
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Table A1.2 Panel A - 2SLS Financial Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT
OChat 4.871*** 0.875* 0.944* -0.596*** -0.038*** -0.049***
(0.222) (0.511) (0.562) (0.075) (0.013) (0.012)
lnAT 1.223*** 0.033*** 0.303* 0.301* 0.053*** -0.176*** -0.018*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.023***
(0.056) (0.002) (0.158) (0.155) (0.004) (0.019) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Wmtb -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_roa 0.106*** -0.186 -0.084 -0.091 -0.142
(0.019) (0.146) (0.163) (0.156) (0.162)
ppeAT -0.162*** -0.211 -0.376 -0.359 -0.220
(0.025) (0.275) (0.356) (0.342) (0.296)
w_ret1 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dpAT 0.242*** 3.220 2.935 2.875 3.461
(0.064) (2.730) (2.205) (2.147) (2.954)
PU -0.000* 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*



















ebitdaAT 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.075***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
w_nwcAT -0.260*** -0.256*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
capexAT -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.197*** -0.199*** -0.204***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
leverage -0.069*** -0.191*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.188***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
sdebitdaAT5 0.048*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.042**
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
xrdsales 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
distdummy -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
aqcdummy -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -12.157*** 0.258*** -2.058 -2.076 0.162*** 1.798*** 0.336*** 0.500*** 0.508*** 0.380***
(0.573) (0.022) (1.330) (1.354) (0.032) (0.187) (0.015) (0.037) (0.036) (0.022)
Observations 30,618 53,760 30,618 30,618 30,618 15,429 29,203 15,429 15,429 15,429
Number of gvkeynum 4,499 7,102 4,499 4,499 4,499 2,101 3,546 2,101 2,101 2,101
R-Squared 0.719 0.114 0.246 0.253 0.121 0.481 0.478 0.504 0.504 0.505
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Table A1.2 Panel B - 2SLS Financial Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT
OCbhat 4.871*** 0.853* 1.015* -0.596*** -0.042*** -0.049***
(0.222) (0.481) (0.607) (0.075) (0.013) (0.012)
lnAT 1.223*** 0.033*** 0.302* 0.299** 0.054*** -0.176*** -0.018*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.024***
(0.056) (0.002) (0.158) (0.150) (0.004) (0.019) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Wmtb -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_roa 0.106*** -0.186 -0.084 -0.089 -0.146
(0.019) (0.146) (0.163) (0.153) (0.160)
ppeAT -0.162*** -0.211 -0.375 -0.361 -0.217
(0.025) (0.275) (0.355) (0.337) (0.293)
w_ret1 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dpAT 0.242*** 3.220 2.929 2.880 3.441
(0.064) (2.730) (2.198) (2.108) (2.949)
PU -0.000* 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*



















ebitdaAT 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.074***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
w_nwcAT -0.260*** -0.256*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
capexAT -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.205***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
leverage -0.069*** -0.191*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.188***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
sdebitdaAT5 0.048*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.044**
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
xrdsales 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
distdummy -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
aqcdummy -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -10.845*** 0.258*** -1.822 -1.727 0.106*** 1.637*** 0.336*** 0.507*** 0.498*** 0.387***
(0.514) (0.022) (1.198) (1.113) (0.033) (0.167) (0.015) (0.033) (0.033) (0.023)
Observations 30,618 53,760 30,618 30,618 30,618 15,429 29,203 15,429 15,429 15,429
Number of gvkeynum 4,499 7,102 4,499 4,499 4,499 2,101 3,546 2,101 2,101 2,101
R-Squared 0.719 0.114 0.246 0.261 0.121 0.481 0.478 0.504 0.504 0.506
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Table A1.2 Panel C - 2SLS Financial Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT
OCchat 21.889*** 16.948*** 16.953*** 2.558*** 0.302* 0.272
(5.949) (6.137) (6.194) (0.254) (0.170) (0.167)
lnAT 1.123*** 0.033*** 0.939*** 0.926*** 0.062*** 0.105*** -0.018*** -0.012 -0.011 -0.023***
(0.300) (0.002) (0.333) (0.325) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003)
Wmtb -0.004*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_roa -0.850*** -0.186 -0.679*** -0.678*** -0.156
(0.177) (0.146) (0.146) (0.144) (0.160)
ppeAT -0.154 -0.211 -0.363* -0.350* -0.218
(0.104) (0.275) (0.209) (0.204) (0.292)
w_ret1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dpAT 1.556** 3.220 1.910* 1.888* 3.438
(0.734) (2.730) (0.987) (0.976) (2.934)
PU -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000***



















ebitdaAT 0.008 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
w_nwcAT -0.262*** -0.256*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
capexAT -0.199*** -0.190*** -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.203***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
leverage -0.260*** -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.189***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
sdebitdaAT5 0.057*** 0.016 0.041** 0.042** 0.043**
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
xrdsales 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
distdummy -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
aqcdummy -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -9.170*** 0.258*** -7.198*** -7.020*** 0.106*** -0.742*** 0.336*** 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.394***
(2.577) (0.022) (2.708) (2.643) (0.032) (0.110) (0.015) (0.073) (0.072) (0.022)
Observations 30,618 53,760 30,618 30,618 30,618 15,429 29,203 15,429 15,429 15,429
Number of gvkeynum 4,499 7,102 4,499 4,499 4,499 2,101 3,546 2,101 2,101 2,101
R-Squared 0.630 0.114 0.501 0.505 0.122 0.509 0.478 0.507 0.507 0.505
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Table A1.2 Panel D - 2SLS Financial Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT cheAT
FEhat 1.230 0.546 0.489 2.853*** 0.319*** 0.407***
(1.281) (0.547) (0.366) (0.247) (0.068) (0.038)
lnAT -0.004 0.033*** 0.023 0.022 0.033*** -0.125*** -0.018*** -0.035*** -0.040*** -0.027***
(0.045) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Wmtb -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
w_roa -0.360*** -0.186 -0.224** -0.226** -0.169
(0.079) (0.146) (0.102) (0.104) (0.145)
ppeAT -0.202 -0.211 -0.214 -0.213 -0.213
(0.285) (0.275) (0.297) (0.297) (0.296)
w_ret1 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dpAT 3.559 3.220 3.491 3.488 3.479
(2.992) (2.730) (2.972) (2.972) (2.967)
PU -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000



















ebitdaAT -0.276*** 0.076*** 0.048*** 0.037** 0.066***
(0.036) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
w_nwcAT -0.238*** -0.256*** -0.266*** -0.264*** -0.265***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
capexAT -0.157*** -0.190*** -0.201*** -0.197*** -0.207***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
leverage -0.144*** -0.191*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.188***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
sdebitdaAT5 0.094*** 0.016 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.046***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
xrdsales 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
distdummy 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
aqcdummy -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.068 0.258*** 0.153* 0.133*** 0.252*** 0.030 0.336*** 0.362*** 0.356*** 0.408***
(0.151) (0.022) (0.082) (0.046) (0.053) (0.033) (0.015) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022)
Observations 30,618 53,760 30,618 30,618 30,618 15,429 29,203 15,429 15,429 15,429
Number of gvkeynum 4,499 7,102 4,499 4,499 4,499 2,101 3,546 2,101 2,101 2,101
R-Squared 0.125 0.114 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.589 0.478 0.514 0.516 0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VARIABLES wFVlevel wFVlevel wFVlevel wFVlevel wFVlevel wFVlevel wFVlevel wFVlevel
OChat 0.3762*** 0.2131*** 0.2334 0.0940 2.6554*** 1.6996*** 1.8895 1.1543**
(0.1174) (0.0682) (0.1453) (0.0683) (0.8574) (0.4398) (1.3633) (0.5574)
dOChat -0.1115 -0.0528 -0.0885 -0.0425 -0.9168 -0.9103 -0.7420 -0.0400
(0.1090) (0.0651) (0.1231) (0.0577) (0.9157) (0.6687) (0.6769) (0.3113)
dOChat2 -0.5671** -0.3973 -0.6315** -0.3737 -1.2615 -1.4371 -0.4396 0.1332
(0.2573) (0.2573) (0.2604) (0.2571) (1.7105) (1.2624) (0.6476) (0.5295)
quartilePU_1 -0.2981*** -0.1484*** -0.3079*** 0.2356
(0.0976) (0.0489) (0.0901) (0.2442)
dquartilePU_1 0.2161*** 0.1452*** 0.1511*** 0.0729
(0.0406) (0.0204) (0.0380) (0.0980)
dquartilePU_12 -0.1202** 0.0051 -0.1389*** 0.1881
(0.0475) (0.0229) (0.0422) (0.1182)
quartilePU_4 -0.1645*** -0.1258*** -0.2210*** -0.2547*
(0.0501) (0.0275) (0.0510) (0.1503)
dquartilePU_42 0.0147 -0.0583*** -0.0397 -0.2959***
(0.0334) (0.0177) (0.0327) (0.1046)
OChat_quartilePU_1 0.1526*** 0.2789*** 1.2860*** -0.4589
(0.0480) (0.0649) (0.3612) (0.7611)
dOChat_quartilePU_1 -0.0615*** -0.0711*** -0.2609* -0.1158
(0.0194) (0.0269) (0.1531) (0.3018)
dOChat_quartilePU_12 0.0777*** 0.1157*** 0.7571*** -0.2457
(0.0243) (0.0324) (0.1725) (0.3760)
OChat_quartilePU_4 0.1438*** 0.3267*** 1.3429*** 0.4542
(0.0339) (0.0655) (0.2749) (0.4498)
dOChat_quartilePU_4 -0.0689*** -0.0913*** -0.5587*** -0.1740***
(0.0102) (0.0265) (0.0897) (0.0608)
dOChat_quartilePU_42 -0.0208 0.0547* -0.0111 0.4500
(0.0199) (0.0322) (0.1551) (0.3032)
PU 0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
dPU -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
dPU2 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
OChat_PU -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0012
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0010)
dOChat_PU 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0007*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004)
dOChat_PU2 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004* 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Constant -0.4958** 0.1152* -0.3506*** 0.1714*** -0.3316* 0.1256* -0.4575 -0.2392
(0.2105) (0.0675) (0.1224) (0.0664) (0.1940) (0.0675) (0.4437) (0.2042)
Observations 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183
Number of gvkeynum 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267
R-Squared 0.337 0.337 0.338 0.338 0.331 0.333 0.341 0.340
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1.4: Firm Value regression with dependent variable and controls following Fama & French (1998), and four variants of 2SLS instrumental 
variables for organization capital.




OC Variables = 
OC 0.2273*** 0.3762*** 0.2131*** 0.2273*** 0.2334 0.0940
(0.0675) (0.1174) (0.0682) (0.0675) (0.1453) (0.0683)
dOC -0.0570 -0.1115 -0.0528 -0.0570 -0.0885 -0.0425
(0.0629) (0.1090) (0.0651) (0.0629) (0.1231) (0.0577)
dOC2 -0.4428* -0.5671** -0.3973 -0.4428* -0.6315** -0.3737























PU -0.0002*** 0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
dPU -0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
dPU2 -0.0000* 0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0001*** 0.0000































Constant 0.0263 0.5117*** -0.4958** 0.1152* 0.3056* 0.0875 0.5117*** -0.3506*** 0.1714*** -0.0123
(0.0662) (0.1004) (0.2105) (0.0675) (0.1597) (0.0673) (0.1004) (0.1224) (0.0664) (0.1271)
Observations 16,183 37,854 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183 37,854 16,183 16,183 16,183
Number of gvkeynum 2,267 4,469 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 4,469 2,267 2,267 2,267
R-Squared 0.334 0.374 0.337 0.337 0.341 0.334 0.374 0.338 0.338 0.342
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1.5 Panel A: Regression of firm value on OC, PU and controls following Fama & French 1998. Explanatory variable of interests are 2SLS 
OC, and 2SLS OC interacted with policy uncertainty.




OC Variables = 
OC 2.1567*** 2.6554*** 1.6996*** 0.2190 1.8895 1.1543**
(0.4450) (0.8574) (0.4398) (0.5007) (1.3633) (0.5574)
dOC -0.7934 -0.9168 -0.9103 0.3681* -0.7420 -0.0400
(0.5759) (0.9157) (0.6687) (0.2121) (0.6769) (0.3113)
dOC2 -0.8569 -1.2615 -1.4371 0.8149*** -0.4396 0.1332























PU -0.0002*** 0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0004 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001)
dPU -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
dPU2 -0.0000* 0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0001 -0.0001































Constant 0.0108 0.5117*** -0.3316* 0.1256* 0.2147 0.0334 0.5117*** -0.4575 -0.2392 0.0649
(0.0652) (0.1004) (0.1940) (0.0675) (0.1697) (0.1907) (0.1004) (0.4437) (0.2042) (0.1406)
Observations 16,183 37,854 16,183 16,183 16,183 16,183 37,854 16,183 16,183 16,183
Number of gvkeynum 2,267 4,469 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 4,469 2,267 2,267 2,267
R-Squared 0.329 0.374 0.331 0.333 0.340 0.337 0.374 0.341 0.340 0.342
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1.5 Panel B: Regression of firm value on OC, PU and controls following Fama & French 1998. Explanatory variable of interests are 2SLS 
OC, and 2SLS OC interacted with policy uncertainty.






Table A1.6: Instrumental variable pairwise correlations.
























































































































































































 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
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